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LIFE 
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&1"31'. Glen Ellyn. Illinoie, in June, 1960. 
ne began his gzaduate studies at Loyola UDiversity in Feb-
ruary, 1961, and ls at present stu<iy1ng phllosophy at ltfarquette 
Un! versi ty. Jll1waukee. wisoonsin. 
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ORlPTER I 
BA.SIO PBILOSOPBIOAL PRINOIPLES 
A.. LID AID womm 
Oharles Rartsho.rne _s born 111 Xi t'ta:rm1Q. Penns71Yat1ia, on 
31m. 5, 189'1, and .reoeiYed h1s ec1:noation at B'aYel'iol'd 0011886, 
PemuJylYa1l1a, and Ranud t1zl1yel's1 ty, whel'Q he reoeiYed his doo-
to.m.l dea.ree 1n philosoph)' in 1923. lIe taught at the UnlTe.rslty 
of Ohicago f.rom 1928 to 1955, and 8il'loe that time has been teaoh-
ing at Emory UniYel'sity,A.tlanta. 
Among h1s wl'1 tinge 81'S inoluded seyen books. oontributions to 
mol'e than half a dozen othe.rs. and ntUnel'OUS articles in the lead-
ing l'e1181ou8 and philosophioal .,cn.rna.ls. l His philosophioa.l 
Wl'i tings al."e desoribed 07 Andl'ew J. Reck tn these te.rms: 
lH.s ftl'st book, The Ph110S0l>~ and PSlohOlOl1 of Sensa.tion, 
i1'1tl'oduoes into 'Pi'Yc1io:t:08ioa~tlieorl pitnelp eTo! eon:Uli-
uity aDd aesthetio feeling espoused by the new metaphysios 
in the philosoph" of ma.thematios and of natu.re. and the 
upshot is the noyel dootrine of the afteotive oontinuum. 
RaJ.ttshome's aext book. Beio.d mtman1mn, aJmOUlloes the meve-
ment as "·a ,enuln8 intes.ra1:ono! .&1:1 ille modern motifs" 
oulm_tins in a new th&01087. whioh he deSignates "theistio 
Jl8tu.ralisll 01' attu'alistio theism," ad. which he p.reeeDte 
in cont.rast with and in opposition to its Bl'eat oontempo.r-
UJ/ .rival. "non-theistio" hUm&lllsm. JIall's Vision of God 
tmde.r'tabs to fOl'mulate the logio 01 iSe new iliel •• and to 
demonst.rate its superiorit, to the olassioal spthesls of 
• Ili 
!see the bibllograph7 at the endot this thesis. 
1 
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Thoas Aquinas. In these works Hartshorne e::rpounde 8 meta-
ph1sios of panpsyohlsm and be also SUSgests what he su.bse-
quently develops mOJ!'e fully as a tbeology of panentheiem. 
In his Terry Leotu.res at Yale later e::rpanded and published 
as The D1v1neBelatlT1tl. Hartshorne 81'stemtioally formu-
lates'tlie panen!Ee!sil:e ooncaptlo11 of de1ty, a oonoept10n 
whioh owes muoh to Vlb1 tehead. Then. 1n Phl1osoEhere sqiJ 
of God, Oharles Hartshorne, in jOint auUldislilp wIth n ... 
lam'"11'iese. presents and disousses all the impoJ!'tant poss-
ible oonoeptio:as of dei t1 t argulng in the oOmJn6llts md in 
the opening &11d oonolud1ng ohapteJ!'s for the Talldl ty of 
pa:u.entheism. 2 
.1. his latest book. The 1:2810 !! PeJi,feo,tl on, 3 Hartshorne presents 
several ]).roofs for the existence of God and reprints of some of 
Us ma.re important joul'nal articles fl'om reoent years. 
0U.r oritioal investigat10n of Hartshorne's thonght will und-
ertake to expla1l1 his fUlldamental philosophical poal tions It to out-
line his oonooption of God. and to oriticise oe.rte.iIl pOints in hls 
pl:d.losopb;v. 
Th1sfirst ohapter deals wlth Bartshornets oonoeption of 
philosoph1 and its method of prooedure, as well as with his own 
baslc philosophr. panpsyohism. 
B. OOlfOEPnO!l OF PHILOSOPHY 
V/hat ls metaph.:vs1os? Hartshorne giTes two answers, the first 
of whioh Sa1'8 that :1 t seeks the most general featu.res of phenomena 
ZAmAN. J. Reok, "The PhilosophY of Oha.rles Ra.rtshome," stu-
dles 1D Vi1li'tehead'a Philos0i!'!Z (l,l'Ulane Studies in Phl1osoEP.l. vo!. 
%; lew O.r!eans It Tu"!aae 11lilv era1 ty, !g~l '. pp. 9tr-'9!. 
30harles Hartshorne, The ~JSio ~ Perfeotion (LaSalle, Ill., 
Open O'ourt Publishing Co •• ""1116~ • 
and of th1ngs.4: Both natural solenoe and mathems.tios stand in 
contl'a.st to it. 
Natural science seeks speciel truths;5 it soaks to "general-
lae tha details so as to arrivo at the total system of detalls 
whioh distinguishes the aotual wol'ld in this coamio epooh, a giant 
detail in the e1au'Ml procession of world systemih" & The ob.&rao-
'er1stle mark of natuzal solence is tbat 1t specialises the lener-
10 t1'&lt8 of hu.man G:lpel'lellOe. ~ phenomel'101oS7, wi tll the ob3eot 
of predlotlDl "he details Ol' speoialisations of future Ctll'pG.rienoe.' 
For Tel'lfloatloa of 1t8 statements, atteJ1tlon to sease data is al3.-
lmpol'tu:'_ 8 
lIetaph,Jsice 01'1 the othel' hand eeeks the moe t se.l'al t.rai ts 
of ph.D ... _ "as J'lelded by abstl'aotion fl'om all 1mag1nabll va.r1 ... 
able details of expel'ienoe. ,,9 The alm of metaphyslos is not to 
predict. but to .relate us "oonsciously to the outlines and the 
4ohal'lee Ra.rtshoZ'll8. Befond ~_ (Ohioago &1'1d New YoZ'lt, 
Willett, Ola.rk, and 00 •• l§'$ ). p~. !6S. ' • 
5:rbld., p. ~6'. 
Gz,bl,d,.. p. 268. 
'Ibld. 
-axlld*. p. 267: l'For knowledge of speoial tru1;hs, the k1nd 
sought D phySiCS, sense.data are all-impol'tant." See also p. 268: 
"Ill utural science verification 1s effeoted by attentioJ1 to do-
tails of experience •. " 
ilbld., pp. 269-270. 
pezman •• t aspects ot e%1st8n08;"10 In oontrast to Datural solenoe, 
1t generalises on the generl0 tra1ts of human exper1enoe, in order 
to beoome aware of the galleria characteristics of all actual. and 
possible obJeots ot experielloe. l1 The Terlflcatioll of metaphyslc-
al statemellts is effected by "attentlon to experienoe's genel'1c 
tl's.l ts, e. g.. memory. an1iioipat1on, des1.re. y!:vl(lness, disoord." 12 
n the vaguer pheno __ of emot1on, more or less oonsolCllsmEuBor1, 
dim alttloipatloll, aesthet1c harmony and discord." 13 
But mthematlcs also treats of the SSllRio i.ra1 is of all rea ... 
11ty.14 How 18 it d1sttnguished from a.tap~vs1os' 
There are two tlpes of generio ira1 tEn a) .. those whioh Gall 1Jl 
prino1ple ,or in the1r fbi te aspe ota, be acourately d1agr8.llfl8d in 
s1lDboll0 sets.1t OBly these oan be perfectly ~leaJ.' &lld ae,flnl te, 
and fU'8 such beoause of the ab.ru.pt oOlltrasts of sensory qual 1 tles. 
Mathe. tios deals with this type of gGlleric t.rai ts. 
b) Tnlts whleh Itue inoapable of symboll0 embodime1'lt of this 
Ileat and definlte kind," whioh ounot be who111 clear or wholl.1 
con&lst8llt ln thell' tm&1'11ngs beoause they form the OOJltlnuOtls as-
lotb,d., p. 268. 
111"14• 
121b14,_ 
l3]:bid •• p. 26'7. 
14Ibld., p. 2'73. 
peot of expezienoe. They form the province of metpjpbysios.15 
Metaphysios thus treats of the non-mathematloaJ ganerlo 
tl"aits of all objeotsof e:rparienoe. There e..re two distlnot steps 
in its p.rooedu.res the phenomenologioal lnqUlz:.v. or ths searoh for 
generio tnl ts, and the drawing out of oonsequencee from the 
t.ralta dlsoOTezed and deflned. 
A ,ene.rl0 t.rai1: ls neoess&rily exemplified in any possible 
expel"ienoe, 00U'f8ra817, 8xpel"ienoe ls not possible if the generic 
tatt. a.re not exemplified in it. !lo establish whioh t.t-alts are 
generic. we _at ask. "Is expe.rlenoe possibl.e if this ualt is not 
exempl.ified in 1t,.. _mary is taken as am .mmple: "No one will 
dany that he knows what ls meant bV a memozy wi th othe.r quanti ta-
tlYe features than the human, 8uoh as longer Ol." mortel" span, 
gl"eate.r or less vividness. !hese features are giTen as speolal. 
oases. But 1.f we tr;, to genel"alise be70lld memo,ry altogether, we 
flnd ow sel Tes in eo nt l' ad 10 1:1 on wi th the g1 yen. " l' Gene.ral1.1ins 
beltond memo.ry oauses the tani ty of time to dlsa.rpea.r; but beoause 
theun1 t7 of time is eVldent. memoJ'Y must be a sene.rl0 t.r&1t of 
all expGrS.enoe. othe..l' t.ralte oan be put to the same test: it 
thel.t- ab •• noe from experienoe makes expel"ienoe impossible. tbey 
ue genul0 trld t8 of alle:xpe.t-lenoe. 
lSOf. 1:t»1..4 •• f pp. 2'13-274. 
161bl4,_ • p. 2'11. 
l"1b&d.', P. 2'12. 
6 
Onoe the sen.zlG 1;.ra11;8 of phenomena. O!' ·oatego.rlee,,,18ha.ve 
be.n d180ove"84. "the Ha' 18 a _t1;81' of a.cluotion t.rom det1m.-
tiona which attempt to state the 1nte.r.relat1ona of eatego.rles ex-
hilt!'.' 1I1t_ phenomena_w19 The metaphy8ioiam attempts to expli-
oate the btell1g1bl11 t7 lm,pl101 t in the defin1 tlol'l8 gathe.red In-
dtlotlYe17 in the phenomenOlogloal lnquuy. oz, b1 aUt&&' \Yo.rds, to 
analy •• GO~.Pt .. 20 
Jla.ftQe.rne'$ seoon4 anewe!' to, "Qat te metaphyelGe'l" ls that 
" .. tap~8108 studies non-reet.riotlvw ax1etentlal attlrDatlons."21 
.A. purthl17 .re.ulotin atatemG!l.t of the aletentlat 'Jpe atf1rma 
the exlst •• _ of 0_ th1l1B~. but :11'1 80 dolns exolude. the .cd.stenoe 
of Qothe.r; for: o:nmple. "'!hen are men in the .room' denies that 
the .room 18 filled 80114 t1*OJn floo.r to oel11as with wheat 0"'- sand; 
all4 'f"1'8 ..... DO Ilea 11'1 the .room' aff1.t'me that en.r,. nbetantl&l 
part of the .ro_ .ontaln8 80118thtq (If oDl7 all', o.r a 'Yaotmm' 
f1.tmlsJd.nB 'bee paBs .. ge to r&d iant enel-S7) othel' than ran: 22 11 .A. 
l I I .1. • 
18of. iill.., p. 2'10: "!be moet sene.ral. phenomena 1n this sense 
aft ph11os0~1 oat •• o.rl.s. such aa .relation, tJrl.na. ohaD.se. 
&0'aa11t7_ ••• " 
1'J~&4"t p. 2'11. 
2Otb14. I ••• aleo BeL9A1q of Pe.rfeot1e. p. Ilt "I q.ree 
with Lel1illB tlJt.t .. tap ·sl'iirJ.'i ii..m,mr;; a tuenlon of the 10-
Sl. oa1 atftotue of oomepts, anA that .the.tloal _thod 18 the 
'eobloal ke7.1f 
lloh&rl.. Ira.rtahoftl8," )fe tap:tqe leal statemcmts as Non-Rest.rl-
otl" am! EXSatenUal," Be!!e" !! .. ta:el!l8!~aJ 12 (1958). p. 36. 
22D1!_. P. 35. 
, 
0_p1e1817 l'eaul0 ti va sta.tement," on the othe.r h,uul. nit wes that 
all7 8xlstent1a1 possi.bllltl is .rea11.64,·,23 &8. 'lor example. ".10-
th1ns &%1at8." But a whollJ' non-l"Gst.rlotlft statement exolu4es 
I2'JaiDI f.rOJl eJflatello •• "(t~oe:p' bare 'noth1ns' itself."S4 SUe a 
statement 18 lISometld.l38 e$'s." 
How 40 ,.. bow " statement 1s wholly !lon-net.tiott.ve? Hrat, 
11; oannot be fals1fied. .. • Som tM.l'ls .:riB 'a' 1. in nooonoe1Table 
oil'oumstanoea ta181tlable. alnoe the fa1s1t7il1B experience woUld 
haTe to gist'. am 1t w_14 al~ haYe to be the Ql8.rlenoe !! 
eoreWlI8 e:d.stlng.1I8S Seool'1if. tM Rolli' nOZl-.reaU1otl,.e etate. 
meld 18 ven.flable, "But though 'SOIII thlD8 818 tat 18 tmtalcd,fia-
'bl~. 1" 18 TG . rl.fled. eTar,; moment_" 
Whol17 :rum .. .reet.rlotlft ulsten:tial etstemeJlte are neoesS&.r7. 
for the7 exolude notJdne from u1stel:.c'& aDd _n be faletti.a. b~ 
ncthl:ns. fDa "bel.r "t.ruth is neut.nl to .3,1 ubtenttel. alte .. -
na1d:res,,, an« this neutnl1t,. is preoiaely the tletlnS.tlon td. neo-
... 
a~b'4. 
2~.~ ». H. see aleo aharles Hartshomet. ,,Jleta>>h7s108 
and the ... &J.lt7 of Exietential Ju.4smemt .... f_. aeAePDoe of 
~t •• ea. %"0" Le,Ole.ro (London. Ge-re rrTen an1iii"tn;' I'n Gif, iid.llarl.. 1961)'. p. 111. ,. ft.e,re are, then. three JIlO4al 
to.rma ot e:d.stsnt1a1statementl thoee wIlloh contradiot fIft~7 poe-
itt:" e:d.sten1d.a1 &88 ..... tl01'11 thoae .111011 oontl'adloi so_ poeltl" 
exi.etelltilll aa_ .. tions but 88fte W1 th othe.r8; thoee whloh Gontn-
dlot no 811011 aaae.rtlons." 
2&.ra.rteho.rae:, "lfetaph1Bloal state.nte &8 lfon-Rest.r1otlve 
and E%1etenttal... p. 3&. 
8 
.8alt7_ 
Mathemat10s als. studles who117 non-~strlotlye atatements, 
but onl.7 thoae of the llonexlatentla1 yarlet", it .xplo.re. p08s1b1-
l1ti8., "hUe meta:pb'e1os 1;.I'18S t. -express _.t all posslbilities 
of exlstenoe have 1n ooaon," 01' "the s"1'10t17 =i,. .. 8&1 features 
of exlet81d;1a1 posslblll '7. those w]d,oh oaxmot 'be une:rempllfied. 
~h... WO oOl'lOeptlOl18 of metapQsloe are not oppoae4 to e aoh 
othel's aooo.r41DS to botb, metaph7810a seeu the most p-.ral &lld 
'IUllye .. aal oha.l'aotez1etloe of expe,rlenoe, *loh cluaraoterlnlos are 
neoeeeari.l7 e:rempl1tlea 1l'l 8,.e.r'l experlenoe. a.eYez, alnoe .. 
e:l'p110.1' torJalatlon ot these wo oomeptione 411f8.1'S, thell' e:r-
plloit, to.l'Sllatea oonol1l81one ale. 41ffe". 
o. BlRTSBORIE' S PAllPSlOBtSll 
ne p.nGanologlGal lDquU7 ot .e fJrst .... mrmtloned ool'lOep-
tloll of phllOSopiq 'bes1na w1 til the o'bse1'ftt10n that .ere aea to 
be b. ,Hat olasaes ot th112la: o1-,.a_. and thlnss tbat are not 
GrIan1alft8.a, ft .. the eeuoh tor ,ene.rl0 t.nlts, 01- "ooSJDlo ftl"1-
abl ••• • as •• e. to be blooted at tllt yftl., nut b1 a 410hoto. 121 
t.. th1qs of OU e:rpe.rlenoe. 
But at thl. p011'1t a wot!!!ala 1s l11tzoduoed. • Theft are 
26xbld •• pP. 36-37. 
a 7JJartshO.nte.. B,ez~nd. ~n1am. p. 111. 
280t. &b&4 .• , p. 112. 
, 
good l"ea.sone. howevez. for think1ng that the lnozga.n1sans a..re sim-
ply aggregates at )jans whioh s..t'e themselves .. ganisma ... 29 The 
elements of inorganic things exhibit activit1es analogous to those 
of organio things. The un1ve.t'se itself is "ozgantsed" b1 the unt-
ve.rsal laws of natu.re and i" thus slm1lar to an o.rgan1c th1ng. 
These obsel'VStions allow U8 to say that 1 t 1s at leut a .reason-
.... t 
e;ble Yin that all thlll8s are in some way o.rga.n1o. 
Hartshorne states biB ~o,hesis in these tezma: theze seem 
to be two classes of enstents; howeve.r, let us call 1no.rga.nlc 
things 8fU5~esate8, and call organic things, as well an anythinS 
else which 1"eseJl?ble~ the o.t'ganlc, inti'Vidual,s. Then, insofar as 
th1llgs ue inti 1 v1duals .rather than aggregates, thel will all fall 
on a single scale, the organic scale.30 
But what doee 1 t Dean to be orsanlo? What ""'tables apply to 
eve.rytMng on 'this 80a16' FlI'st. we notice that "the most obvious 
feature at the 80&1e is increasing oomplex1 t7 of spat1o-tempo.ral 
st.rnctUt'e."31 Seoond, we notice that over part of the soale, 
there is an increasing complexity of psyoholOgio2l st.ruotnre. 32 
Third, we notioe that spatlo-tempo.ral oomplexity 1s Nsardeil as a 
slgn of psyohological oomplexity; that ls, the two t3'pGs of com-
r, 
29.Ibld. 
_ • T •• 
300f. ibS:d,a t p. 112. 
31~..l~1,~ .• , p. 115. 
32fJ>ld.. p. 116. 
10 
ple:rit1 are c01"1"elatlve. Tho natural question 1s then. "Oan the 
psrChological variables be extended OTe~ the whole soe~a' Oan we 
p.redloate p81ohologloaloharaotel."istlo8 of all things 1nsofar as 
tbq &1"e indlylduals?" 
The anaveJf. whioh both tells lU3 what it me811S to be orgarJ.o 
and at tJB saJte· time attempts to Just ify panPS1ohS.sm. falls into 
two pa.rtsl 1) P870h010810al variables o,~ be thus extended to All 
things: a) tmJ.ess we p,otually 40 thiS, oertain ~eas cf the soale 
1"emaln impenet1"able mJsterles. 33 
1) !At 118 taltethe variable "memo.r:t' for an e:rample. I t8 in-
ttl'll te extension both in l"egard to span and oomplex11:1 ls conceiv-
ab le. 34 01" let lUI conaid at" "feeling" = its int ansi tlT. or vB.l'la t 1 0 
ot intensity. is potentiall,. infinite. ~ same holds true .regar-
ding its 't"aguemse o.r olarity.sa Beoat'lSe theae and other psyoho-
logioal TMiablea oan bave an lntin1te n1ll'!ibe.r of forms, 1t is 
poe slb 1& 1I1&t8Ve1"1 ln4,.vi thtal possesses some to.rm ot th&m. 36 
33Ib14. 
.. ... 
340f. ~bi4~. pp_ 116-117. 
3ts:19..llJ .. _ t p. 118. 
a~f. pp. 119 ... 120: "Thus the. main 1"8.rlables of peycbol(8)1 
a.re of· . ~ted b1"ea4th o.r flenb 111')1_ Benoe 1 t 113 bluff and not 
al"gument to .rejeot the pS7ohl0 lnt e.rp.retatlon of the scale of be-
lngs on tbt g.raa.nd that. th1al:nte.rp.retatlon ls 'anth.ropomo.rphic, , 
for 1t is p.reclsely in its psychlc tl'Jakeup that a being oan be in-
t,U,l.i te~ othe.r than -.n. The values of psychlc va.rlables whloh are 
use '61 panpsyohlem to int e.rpl'ot the subanlme.l a.n.d tbe supe.rhtn.nan 
areyalUfUl .realised in man. Those who say psychic concepts are too 
n.a.rrow toapp11 to all the unlverse are not thinking of these con-
II 
2} "The second ground for using tho payohologleal variables 
over th" whole soala of beings 1s that there s.re no other 'Variab. 
les. ff3'1 The only competl tor B:l.rtshcrne considers is the ftl"iables 
employed in physios; but those tell us oIlll what .relatl0.Ils th1ngs 
u:ve to eaoh other, not What thlngsa.re.38 
Ra.,rtshorne expla.1ns further wbJ ps;vohoJ.ogi3al variables ec 
be the onl; variables with universal applioation. All 1&riablea 
-
mIlst be va..rlablea of' h11m!ll experience; we oan oonoeive of lilffe.r-
enGes bS,tlyeGll this &:rpsr lance and tba t, but thel's 1tt no meaningful 
oontrast between 'a"ha. t is expe.r lanced s.rA wlm t 113 simply not expel'-
it'Ulced. All we knOl/il is hwoo.n experience. Generall.r:ir.g beyond 
thAt :means to genGralize away knowleltse. 
On ~tshol'ne' s ~vpothesls. tben, that some set of T&riables 
is cosmo'. and taking into oonsideration, ashe doaa, only the yar-
ia.bles used 111 psyohology and in plljslce flnd l"oduoiIl8 the lo.tte.r 
to the tar.el', the patlJ)S),ohist int erpretatlon readily follows. 
Two :m&~o,r OOllSEH1UenOOG of this position are the affeotive oontin-
uum and OJ.; sanie sym};8 t~. 
Come.tn1:ug the f1rst oousequenae, Re..rtshorne not en 'tbo:t :pat1 .... 
oepts in their fUll range. They 'betray themselYes by their rei ter-
ated charge that to psyohologize everything is to. humanize eve1'1-
thing •• tI. It ieeesy to show that we must generalise beyond pe7oh-
010g7 ..... it an ubi t.rarl1y l'eet.rioted l'lSyoholo81 is in question. 
But the onl;,- sonu~ appron.ch is fir at to gene.rallze 0lU' psyohology_ If 
3'1Ib3;d,., p. 121. 
ZSCt. :tbii!. , 
,870111_ i. 411'801;17 Oppose4 to _te.rla.1.1.llI, whlch ·poalts the .s-
leteJlG8 of rdo_, 41eoontinuoue, 41aore'8, 1D4epen4ent btta of 
_tte.r. aenta of feeliDS and life, laolate4 exoept for aoo14ental 
exte.rml .relatiollS. Umeles8 an4 lUlohansiDB w1 th .re.ptot to lnt8 .... -
nal oonstitutlO1l .,ut bence 1d. thont ,1'owth and eyolution."St But U 
1t le tne tltat all .slateata, lns~fa.r as the,. are 11141Y14u.ala. 
po •• es8 p.,.ollio t.N1ta in 80tr8 VI&7 •• .r 111 aome aesr.e, nothlD1 Gall 
'be 4eT014 of 11fe. The afteott.... eont1nu. 18 an 1l'lav ...... nt fo.r 
..... ~ taUlt, paloholosloal oo~."lons wbloh t8D4 t. foste.r 
_te.rl83.1.. llWthu. 'h0118h tMe acoviDe ls, in om wa7, a aon-
eeq •••• e of p&l1pa7oJd.S1l'l. 1n ucthe.r it 1a part of the phenOll8110108-
10&1 lntU.r7 .... lnaotar. ,hat ls, ... 1" ae.b to 8q11oat. expe.r-
lenoe. \7. m1sht oall 1" :pe.rt of .. "panpa101d.at pheDomenal .. ,._" 
IS:,.. pobt. ua t. be n.ea in th1. oomeptloll. ., PSJ'Ohio 
Ya.rlable. 1M be ... 1,...4 mathe_tloal17. but the,. QuSh' not to be, 
t. in .real1',. tlte,. &Noontlnuoua.40 'b) Aesthetl0 qualltles are 
not .,e17 associated wi. til seneo.r7 q_ll tles. thGJ are. in part at 
leaat, 14entltle4 wi th senstJ.rl qaal1 tlea. "!Phua. the 'plet,' of 
,ellow 18 the ,.e11owness of tbe ,.e11ow ... 41 ,. •• lW oau be 8.l'.M\l;vaed 
tnto 41ft.rent qual1 t16., bu.t we tlltllit .re .. be.r tJat these 41ffel'ent 
39aeok, !I- 01',. t p. 92. 
4Oo~le. Ba~t8harDe. fk. Ph&~OB~ aDd PBfOh010~of Sensa-
tloB (Oh1caso. Ul1S.Y.,sitl ol'"1niloaao r'a;-nlr. pp. ~ .. 
411,,4., p. '. 
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qulitles are the .resUlts of analysls and do not exlet as suoh in 
rea11t7. 0) "Expe.t"lenoe is 8001a1 th.roughout, to lts uttermost 
f1"agments or 'elements'." 42 Expe.rienoe DUst be oemelved as a 
8001a1 oontinuum. il) "The int.rlnsl0 mtures of sensory quali tles 
tena to ln01 te modes of behav1ol'," and are not met-ely assooiated 
w1 tll them. 43 e) SensO.r7 quall tles have a common o.rlgin. nOn thls 
po1:nt ... na_ly. the evolution of sensol'Y qualltles f.rom a oommon 
01'1s1n. lB.rtahome's indebtedness to Petree's oste801"7 of fl.rstness 
is pronounoed. ~U8 a oontinuum of sheer. undifferentiated, in-
ttete.rmtnate, 'VaBUG feel1ng beoomes speoifled and deie.rm1ne.te, 
through a process of objeotifioatlon, lnto partioular sensOZ7 
quali tles. '1144 Thus "fee11ng" ls p.r1mo.rdlall;v undifferentiated, 
but made dete.rminate b7 lts objeotifloations at vulons levels and 
1n T&rlous ways; fu.rthe.r, "feellng*' forms a continuum .rather than 
a se.ries of dlso.rete values. 
Thls leads to the seoond consequenoe, orBanio sJlllP&th1, fo.r 
U j. L r 1 I • 
421bid. f P. 8. 
43r;b3td• 
4"aeok,.u. oi t. p. 95. See The Fbl10S0:2h~ and P~Oh010fl 
of Sensation, p. lJT""'"fhe f1rst appea.ranoe 0' a g~Ten· qU1t7 s.~a 
ii.r'ialn .Iapln e'falutlon i8 not a p1U'e 'eme.rgenoe t (though it 
has. an e:U1argen t, aspeot) of the quali t7. lll'l.related to the p.revious 
state of atwe, but 1s 1l'1telllg1ble 1n muoh the same fashion as 
the appearanoe of a new organ. A primitive quali t7 of aenaation 
ma" be ooncel ved. suoh tlm t the development of mo.re speoifio qual-
1tles aay be made intelltglble as a true development. or dlffer-
ent1at1ont .rathe.r than as a shee.r dlspl&. cement of the old and 1.r-
.ruptlon or the new." Also p, 208: "Aooording to this 'View.. the em-
Eu.·.ent 1s not uttel'ly lneompuable to the pze-e:rist1118 qual 1 ties, 
but 1s .related to 1t as the mo.re to the less detel'.tnate." 
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all the PSlOhic variables can thtts be reduced to feell!!S, it this 
tem 1s taken to include sensory and aesthet10 quali tles. DOW, 
aco01"dlng to panpayoh1sm, all 1n41 viiiuala have the power of feel-
ing t or of 8l1!1!: thz- 45 To 81JDp8 thl ze w1 th ano the.r 1 e to share in 
the feelings of another, or to inttli t his feellngs, a W feeling of 
feelings." But thls tntui tlon, while being the basis fG%' all know-
le4se, 1s not the cm.l1 kind of knowledge. !that "human minds com-
m1Ul1oate 01117 1n41raotl:r. tlu-ouSh -.te.ri&l means,"'" and not b7 a 
d1.reot :1nmltlon, is quite oby10us. without intuition, howeve.r, 
this 1ll41.reet twe of knowledge woulil be impossible. 
An ind lyl dual lntl11ts the DBmbe!'s of his ovm bodr. Buma.n be-
ings lntuit the feelings of the pa.rts of thei.r bodtes, or ahara in 
thel.r 18el1.s.4 '1 These parts nre ()1.1.r cells, .hleh tntu t the 
feellllg8 of their pal'ts, moleoules and atoms, as well as the feel-
ings of the whole of whioh the,. t:LN a pa.rt, the human peu."son. In 
a somewhe. t similar way.. men and til e rest of the unlve.rse conatl t-
ute the body of tbe world mind, or Godls mlnd, and In some degree 
direetly know his 1.811n88.48 In the Ga.se of an eleGtrol'l, which 
sq •• r II • 
450f. !glond, H11lI¥U,lan. pp_ 195-196. 
~b.1.d... p. 19Eh 
470f. l .. bl4,._ I p. 19'1. 
<tSOf. ibid. t "We can now explain why men do not oOmnl1nicnte 
wi th one aui'ftiG .... prlm.rl17 by 41 ..... ot a,mpath7. Oomplex minils like 
01.ll". s derlye their. complex oon. tent trom lnfel'lo.r minds through a 
..... 1& it on of pa.!"tlal dependenoe upon them, 1. e.. upon the lUll ts 
composins thel .... bodies. If we hUll'Bl'l beings .reuh.a one anothe.r dl.r-
ect17, weahOUld be dependent upon one anoth.!' 1n the Bame d.raatlc 
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has no bOd11y parts subject to it, its fellows or neighbozlng alec-
t~ons take the plaoe of a b04y.49 A hle~rchy is thus establlshed 
W87 in whioh we and OU bodl1y puts are lnte~dependent. and then 
indeed would human personalities lose thel~ freedQm and dlstlnct-
n$SS with ~espect to one 8l'lothe~. But all thls is tho~oughly oon-
slstent with the ldea that hume.n minds do aot direotly upon thel~ 
!bodily ee.l.'Yaltts, .thC. oel1S1 eft vlce versa (the advantage on 0'I1.r slde being that no one ind vidual in the body has marly as muoh 
influenoe as otJ.r'"'OwirPersonality upon the whole slstem). It 1s also 
oonsistent with the idea that low .... grade mindS, 'disembodied spir-
~ ts.' aot upon their equals directly and wi th the idea tbat men are 
oells in the bOdy of Gotf yet are partlally free with ~espeot to ~im. It is only the oombinatlon of equality with oomplexity that 
lmakes indi~eotness :neoessary in the relations among man.n 
See also Pp. 284-285: nIt is necessary to this view that CJ.oo 
should also be a datum for us, that we should d1..rectly pa~ticlJ.l8te 
in him. And if positivists do not know it, 1t might pe~haps inter-
est them to be told that the great theolpgla.ns have asserted dIre6t 
thoughf'alnt intUition of God not onli tor ~tlos but for all men. 
Augustine's doctrine Is noto~ious: but AqU1:ras ca.n be shawn to 
quality .rather than negate it. All talk of l.ttmamnce is a quibble 
indeed. It it be denied. Peiroea.sserted 1t. \~ltehe8d's theory of 
dtrect :prehensions of one' lndi Vidual by another .reoognises no exo-
eption With .regard to Godi, whose oontrol of the world is through 
the direot thoush mo.re or less 1"&8ue a.wueneas whioh each oooasion 
has of his enTiaagement of the future. 
1t 1'he notion of the direot awareneSs of God Is the only e:rplan-
• tlon of the seuerlo 1ntni tiona whioh metaphysios olaims for man. 
~n ex1stential scope these Int111 tions Ue equivalent to omniscienoe, 
thoush in qualit7 of aleamess they are anything but eqUivalent to 
It. They tell us nothing whatever about details as suoh, and eTen 
~s gene.rali tiea thel are at best obsc1U'e. But the .range of obJects 
to whioh the7 are .relevant is identical wi th the .$llg8 known by 
God. " 
490f. Ra..rtshome, The fOBiC of Perfection, p_ 195: "fo rendar 
an eleotron or oth8~ par""Tro e an O1giii!sm ti ts only neoessary that 
nelghbortng eleot~ons O~ othe!' pa.rtiolea shOllld contribute di.reot-
ly t.· 0 eaeh other's Talues, that ls, sbonld dlrec. tll" feel each oth-
er. • •• But pe!'baps a pa~tlcle, like a disembodied spirt t ~ has no 
bodily part.s. I.ts intimates, 11' any, will be its equals.' 
See also p. 196: "Renoe 1 t 1s ~he particle, the lowest. not 
the hisheet, org&:rl1sm .. in spite of what has often been sa.id about 
God - that best fits the idea of an unembodled spirit. The pa~ti­
ole. one might say, is embodied only 1n its enVironment, not in 
itself." 
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of particles, at0JD8. molecules, oells. animals, men. mel God, all 
of wh10h (exoept the lBl'tlcles) dl.rectll teel the teellq8 of the 
puts of their boA1es. 
D. ARGtnmITS FOR PABPSYOBISJI 
lJarlsho1'D8 oflus the. six ruther &rp.mer1ts to.r panpeloblam: 
1) Call_11t,. oan be expla1:aed oDl7 b7 the persistenoe of the 
past into the present b7 aane of I'tfnllo.ry.50 
So Ie' 1.1.8 81I.p:poee that the 1%1t1.11 tlve relation, whioh 
we have held to be SJ1llP&th8tio 1n ee_noe. is p.r1ma.rlly a 
.81atlon of .,..,.thr wlth the oausatlve pZOoesses 1D the 
bod,. It follows that the oelle of the b04; 01' 1. te mole-
cules, or both. maet be pSJehle 1n thelr maDDe1' and degree. 
Indeed 1f oau8al1t7 in the mind-bod;, instanoe 1s 87m-
pathetic, ". sllOU14 at once lnqUlre it all 08118&11t1 ~ 
not be so e%plalned and it the .,e.r7 ldea of t1me doe s not 
luvolve the notion of a s~thetle bond between the ~. 
enta of time • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • But nothlng 1s e%plained by calling the .relat10n oausal, 
slnoe as "e saw above t modern philosoph»' has total17 
tallel to tind 8.117 lntell1g1b Ie account ot causall t7 ex-
cept the aplaDatlon of It in tess of the Qmpathetl0 
rappo.rt [ot Panpl 70hl_]. 51 
Ba.rtaho.n&e oppose. tlae poelt1Y1stl0 l11te.rpl'etatlon of 08.u8&11 t1 to 
h18 GOlDe_ion of Ol'pnlo Qmp.\th7. Elths.r hie posltlon JDWJt be 
a4o:pted. he sal'S, or oauealltl' must be altoge'\he.r ab&n401'184. 52 
6Oof. leok, n. 01t ... pp. 9'.98; Charles lfa.rtsbome Realltz 
!AI Soo&.91 Prooese----moitOD, Beaoon P.ress: Glenooe. 111" ;.ree :Press, 
D!)!). PP. "U.'\7. 
51l:Ial'tshOl'J18. Bel~nil Bn1rp!pl~8m. pp. 19' f 198-199. 
52Hartshor.De, Re~llty ~ ~oo~al P.roc~se, p. '9. 
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2) Apart t.rom panpsychlsm, the.re is no answeJ." to the questlon 
ot unlty-and-mllltiplicity. 0.1" unity wlth111 divo1'slty: foJ." only unto. 
'Versal subjeotivlt)' provides the .requisite Ulllty.53 
3) Likewise, the 00nt1'8st of p8.1'tioula.r and tUliTe.rsal, aotual 
and potential, is furnisbed wi th a pl1.nolple only by universal sub-
jectivlty.54 
4) SUbjects can ohoose between alte.rnatlve poss1bll1ties. But 
there 1s so_th111g correspondlng to oholoe in (supposed) non-sub-
380",S, "811'1oe tbe con01"ete 1s always 10gical1; arbit.rarJ'; tl 55 this 
choioe in a non-sub3eot seems total17 lUlintel1igible. 
5) Qualities belons onl; to subjeots; if all indivlduls s1'e 
not subjects. how are non-subjeots qual.lfied,56 
6) A sub3eot has lnt1'ln810 values. TO be interested in a sub-
jeOt ls to partioipate in lts values, and henoe to enrloh oneselt. 
t • 
53aeclt. 0EJ. olt •• 1" 98. See also gealMl as Social .F.rooess. 
p. "9 t. and. Ohi.r e81rartsh. ome, "1' .. he PhilosopQ orOzes'!ve ~ynt1ie8" 
ls," Joumal of Philosol\ll. 55 (1958). pp. 944-945: It '8111the8is' 
means 'putitni tOletS1", a oombining of faotors lntoa whole. The 
obvious example of a s.rnthesis 1s a single moment8.l'Y h't.1.man expel'-
lenoet in whioh the.re is a d.ive.rel ty of data,. things expe.rlenced. Experenoe puts tosethe1' ita data; theee remain several, but the 
experlenoe in and by whioh they are put togethe1' is one. Synthesis 
is thus the solutloD of the problem of 'the ono and the meny. ,n 
Maeok,.2I._ oit.! P. 98: see a.leo Hartshorne, Roalltl.!! 
~o.qlal ~l'OCeBs. pp;-l7-S0. 
55xbia •• p. 82. 
56IJ>id., pp. 80-82: see also Reck .• E..,E. ~1 t., p. 98. 
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Know1118 the enJoJment whioh another feels over some Talue-ob3eot is 
to possess Talue oneself. A non-subjeot has no values and is not 
able to give a subjeot-enriohlng knowledge. It has nothing to 
reward a subject's interest. 57 
Both Hartshorne's systematic formulation of panpsycblsm and 
his furthe~ arguments for it are based on his first-mentioned oon-
eept ion of' philosoph;v. But philosophy as the study of "oompletely 
non-restrio1d.TG existential statements" gives .rise to oe.rtsin oon-
clusions whioh differ in their expliolt formulation. 
Besides "Somthing exists," we find that "Expe.d.enoe ooours" 
1s also neoessarily true. The statement oan easily be verified, 
fo.r it is obvious that experienoes oocur; but "is the statement 
oonoelvably falsifiable? Would any e:Jpe.rlenoe e:xhlbi t the total 
nonooourrenoe of experienoe? Olearly not."5B Using the same orit-
eria, we find that neoessarily, a) creative syntheSis occurs; b) 
the~e are oonozete aotualities whioh are all both exte~ally and 
internally related; c) infallible, or divine, experienoe ooours, 
and it has falli'ble experienoes among 1. ts obje ots. 59 These oon-
elusions are moze or less summaries of Hartshorne's basic positions 
in neat 10gioal for.m and do not differ essentially from his earlier 
h t • 
5'Baztshorne. Realltz!! ~ocial Proces~, pp. 82.83; Reck, ~. 
clt., PP. 98.99. 
58ual"tshornol. "Ue'taphysioal. statements ae Non-Restrictive sal 
Existential," p. 38. 
59:tpi,d •• p. 47. 
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pOsitions, exoept in the G%plio1t .. nner he 8J."J!'lves at them: we do 
not ask, "Is experienoe possible if they are fa.lser but, "Al:'e the1 
veriflable 'but nonfals1flablef' 
~his rough sketoh of HartShorne's panpcyoh1em neods to be oo~ 
plated b1 a dlsousalon of his oonoeption of God, who forms an In-
tegl"a.l ps,l"t of his philosoph3'. 
Ol:tA.PTER II 
IA.TURE AND EXIS~NOE OF GOD 
God is not something 1noidental to Hartshorne's metaphysics; 
.rath~u't "God as supreme psyohe completes the panpsyohic system."l 
But as this is a oonolusion .rather than a begilU11l'lg, we must firet 
explain the t1P8S of possible oonoeptions ot God, B'a.rtsho.rne's oon-
ceptton. and his pJ:'oofs fo.r God'a existenoe. 
A. TYPES OJ' OOlfOEPTIONS OF GOD 
:Il&rtsho.rne begins his philosophioal theology with an explana-
tion of God's mture • .rathe.r than with p.roots to.r Hls enstenoe. 
Re offe.rs these reasons tor his prooedure:t.radit1onal proofs fo.r 
God I s ex1etenoe lead to the t.radi tlonal conceptlon of God, or a.re 
based on s110h a conception. !hey have, turthe.rmo.re. been proved 
unsat1staot01')'t 
We might not un.reasonably begin with an examination 
of 'the t.rad1t10nal p.roots fo.r God. These proofs of course 
lead, if aD.1Whare, to [t.raditlonal theism]. They have 
been a_mined IBl1Y times by leading philosophers and, 
wi th ino.reasing frequency and emphas1 B, Judged tulsa t1s-
loha.rles Ba.rtshorne, "llan 1n Nature," Ex~.rienoe, Enstence. 
and _t~ Good; EssNs 1n Honor of Faul W'8iss, IV; tHin l'J. tie'S ~oon4a1e, Southern~!!nols-'nlve.rsltl Press, 1961), p. 462. 
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tacto~y. Ought I to add my mite to this 3udgment o~ 
attempt to co~rect modern philosophy on a matte~ whioh 
1 t has so oarefully oonside~ed' It may be sald, however. 
that the proofs have not been really met on their own 
g~cun4. The~e is acme justlce in this claim. .edem 
thought has otten d~lfted so fa~ trom medieval meta .... 
phJsloa as s08.l."ee17to see w.hat that me_physics was 
about. But the force of this cons1ile~atlon is weakened, 
fo.r me atlaast, by another. Modern thoqht has not been 
oontent to pass Judgment on the t.raditlonal proofs; It 
has alec proposed disproofa of God as conceiTed in t.radi-
tional theology. These disproofa bave, if &Dithlng. been 
eTen lees adeqn&ioly Det by traditionalists than tradi-
tional proofs b1 tteil" oritios.! 
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Proofs for his own oonoeption of God. might be So suitable sta..rtlng 
point, but without ti~at making this Idea of God explioit, it would 
be "impossible to look tOl" 8Tidanoe without knowing what idea ls to 
be tested.,,3 BLrtshome's proof flows out of his oonoeption; the 
meanIng of the wo~d "God- is of primal'1 1mpol"ianoG. 
\nte~e can we find out what God ls' Hen of all ages have had 
some ldea of the divine mtue, and despite thei~ ms.ny differenoes, 
all seem to have this mueh in common: -To discusS God ls, by almost 
un1Te~sal usage, to dlaouss some marmet" of'supl'eme' or 'highest' 
or 'beet' individual (or supe~lndividual) being_ As a minimal def-
initlon, God is an entity somehow superior to oth~ entities."4 
Rartshorne then giTes this analysiso'! the Anselmtan notion of God 
20he..rlea ]'ia..rtshome, lIan' sViston of God (Ohioago and New 
York, Wlllett,Ola.rk, cd 0'0., IOU J. "PP; "!'r-58. 
3zbid., p. 58. 
".tbld.. p. 6. 
22 
as "that than whloh none greater oan be oonoelved" I 11 'None' -.y 
mean 'no entlty other than th&t (tho belng 8ald to be perfeot) as 
- -!1 aO,tua1lZ J:.!.. t 01" 2. t rtAy mean 'no entity othol" than !h!1 !.! 11 
elthe.r 1& 01' else 00111(1 be or beoome.' Aooordlng to the tl.rst 
....... ...... III • *_A ...... ____ r 
meaning. the perieot 1s uns}U'l?!ssabl~ in o.<!:q,~eJlt1~~ .2.t posa1bili tz 
even ]!z ~tseH; according to the seoond mewns it 1s un8ur~ssable 
eXC8it l!l. i tseM_ " 5 The fi.rst mea!'l1l'lg 1e oalled "ab 801u te pe.rfec-
tlon," the seoond ".relative. "The wo.rd "g.reate,· oan mean "'in 
some (but not all) .respects' (8&Y in sise o.r 1n ethical. goodness); 
or we _y mean, 'in all .respeots whatever;' whl1e the 30int nega-
tive of these two. 'in no l"espeot.· 81ves the th1.rd posslbill ty." 
l.rol1 the vulou8 oOlllblna.tlons of these posslble meamngs, .Ra.rts-
horne works out these seven possible types of oonoeptlons of God: 
• Ji 
1) Absolute pe.rteotlon in all .respeots; 
fa) Absolute pe.rfectlon In some .respects, .relative pe.rfeotion 
in aU others: 
3) Absolute perfeotion, relat1ve pe.rfeotlon. and lmps.rteotlon, 
eaoh in some respeots; 
4) Absolu.te pe.rteotlon in some respeots» lmpe.rteotion in all 
ethel'S: 
5) Absolute perfeotion in no .respeots, relative in all; 
6) Absolute perfection in no respeots, relative 1n some, im-
perfeotion in others; 
V) Absolute perfeotion 1n no respeots, 1mpe.rteotion in all. 6 
6]:b1d., pp. ' ... 8. 
6Ib,d •• p. 8. 
Th1s listiD8 is 10gloal11 oomplete, but does not mantio!! speolfio 
attributes. Hartshorne gives these flva attrlbutas 32 the moat 
important aDd most often mentioned: 
1) Eter_l - that 113, in some or all aspeotsof his reallt;v 
devoid of ohtmge; 
2) Tempo.r&l - in some o.r all aspects ca16ble of eb.e.nee, at 
least in the fo.l'1D of increase of some kind; 
3) Oonsolous?, aelf-e.wue; 
4) lCnow!l'l8 the "'01"14 OJ:' un1Terse, omn1s01ent; 
6) Wo.rld-1nolusive, haYing all thinSs as oonstituents. 7 
The aeleotl'9'8 oombination oftheae speoifio att.rlbutea e.ooor-
ding to the geneRl patte.rns given in the f1tst 11stlns glves .rlse 
to nine 1118torlo&117 s1fP'11f1oant conoeptions of God s 
1) !he SUpreM as E1;el'rJal-Temponl Consoiousness, la10Wlq and 
inoln.d1ng 'the l'/o.rld. A ttrlbuted to ~enthelsmt Pla'to, 
51'1 31ft, Sohelling, Feolmel', WIll teliiid, !qDa%, Ra4hak-
rlehmn. 
2) The Supreme a3 Eternal Ooneciousness, not knowing or In-
olu41D8 the world. Ada,o.~1.e:.rJ ..... "_he.i.am .....· • 
8) The Supreme as EteJ!"na1 OOl'lSolonaneae, Knowing but not in-
oltuU.ng the world •. 01&881081 theism: Philo, j .. U8ustine t 
Anselm, a1.Ghaszall. rqninas. "'tA!\ln"'ls. 
4) The Su:pftme as the Eter.l be70nd consoiousness and knowl-
edge. Emna.tion1sm: Plotinus • 
... -. II I •• • 
{) The SUpreme as Eternal Oonsciousness, Knowing and inoluding 
the wo.rltl (ao far lIle '1'esl'). !2.l .. !'!'~!31oa+. P!nt.he1s~: San-
Pl"a, Spinoza, R0)10fh 
6 ):ttheSup.reme as Etemal-Tempo.ral OonsolouBneas, Xllowlng but 
t 1 • 
24 
not 1noludtng the world. Temio~a~lstlc thelsm: Sooinus. 
Lequ1e~. 
7} The Supreme as Eternal.Temporal Oonsoiousness, partly ex-
oltud:ve of the World. tillitrEtd, 2nentheism: James, Ehren-
fels, Brightman. 
8) The Supreme as wl10117 Temporal or emerglng Oonsciousness. 
Alexander. Ames. Oattell. 
,) The SUprell8 as Temporal and nonooDsoioua. Wie.n.8 
This thl~d llstins 1s not 108108lly or hlsto~oal17 oomplete, but 
oonta1ns the most important oonoeptions wMoh are histOJ:"lcal17 u-
empllfied. Notloe that only the tust alte.rnatlTe, panenthelsm. 
manages to oombine all five of the attributes ln the seoond list .. 
ing. All other oonoeptions have failed to lnolude some attribute 
or the other. and so have nade God less than the Perfeot :Being, 9 
or that being than wbloh no other oould be oonoeived to be more 
perfeot. 
Olassloal thelsIn, for example, excludes relatlve perfections 
from God and thus oonoei1'es of Him as less than Perfeot BelIl8. 
B'artsho.rn&, on the other hand, dOGS not deny absolute :perfeotions 
of GOdl• but does not see that the inolusion of the se in God neoess-
arily implies the exolusion of relative perfeotions. The two are 
oompatlble.10 On the ground of the compatibility of absolute and 
Saarts!l0me aJ1d Beese, Ppl1os9J2hers Speak !.t!!.!!.. p. 17. 
'.tbld.. pp_ 17..24. and also lIartshome' S o.rl t1018ms before and 
after tlie seleotions throughout the book. 
lOaf. Oharles B'a~t8ho.rne. "Tillloh and the Othel' Gnat Tnu.11-
tlon," Al'!!liolUl Theolo€Qoa1 Review. July, 1961, p. 4: "Tbel'e 18 the 
long. power!urStridltlon f.6at ~o! is the infinite, unoonditioned, 
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.relAtive perfeotions 1n God, olassical theism oan be rejected. be-
08.l1Se it unneoessarily makes God lese than Perfeot Being, and has 
been disproved and can be replaced with a more satiefaotO.r7 alter-
nati .. : 
Fo" nea.rly two thousand years European theology has 
staked lts fortunes upon e. oerta1n oonoeption of div1nity. 
In the last deoade or two a genuinely alte1"native tJ'P8 of 
theol08Y has been proposed - so unobt.rusiTelY, however, that 
nea.rly all opponents of theism a.re stl11 fighting the olde1" 
conception, oon'finoed that if they oan eli.sposs of it the 
theol0810e,1 question w111 be settled. And those who teel dls-
satisfied with 8. Godless universe suppose that it is to 1s.rad-
1 tlonal thaolesy that they must turn. Both ]Briles are mis-
taken. 1'04&7 the theistl0 question, 111ts so ma.~ othel's, is 
a def1n1tely new onei·. The old oontl'oversies ln thelr old torm are antiquated. 1 
Furthermore'. pa.nenthelsm, slnoe it makes God the truly Perfeot 
Being. also makes 11m the tnly wo.rshipful belng. the possesso.r of 
su:p.reme value not onlJ;' oon81d81'&d ln Himel!, but also ooneldel'ed 
precisely unae.r the as:peot of His relations w1 th men. B'al'tsnorne 
asles, ·Can tbe idea of deity be so formulated as to preserve, per-
haps even ino~easo, lts ~ellg1ous value' By religious value I me~ 
the power to 8xp!"ese and enhance reverenoe o.r worship on a hi8h 
ethloal and oUltural level. The question 1s whether ana how God 
oan be oonoeivea. w1 thout 10g1oal absurd! ty, and as havl:r.l.,g suoh a 
and the crrel'simple assumption that the dls3unotlone infinite-tin-
t te. absolute-reJa ttve, unoonditloned-condi tloned are simply ex-
clusive. I haTe often shown.t. and haTe not yet been .refuted, that 
thel' are not so." See also l:'hl1oso;ehe,x:s S2!ak; . !! God" pp. 50'1-508. 
lloha.rlee Hartshorne, "Red. e.f1nittg God," Bew IlUmnist (Ohioa-
go), 'I (1934), p. 51 see also len's Tls10n..2! ~oa:. "W'. r=::2. 
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charaoter that an enlightened person m!!\:,v wOl"shlp and earve him w1 tll 
whole hea.rt and mind."12 The e:recut1on of this .. o~.ct, to b.r1ng 
God to the enlightened person, quite definitely does not belong to 
the above-mentloned tradition that would make 11m absolute (~e-
-
late4), 1}pUtable, eternal (non-temporal), and w_14 predioate any 
positive att..rlbute of Him onlY in a slmbolic mannu. This tradi-
tion tells tta (or tMnkB it does), B'a.rtsllo.rne .,s. what God 1s 
~; no partloula.rll great lntelllg1bl1it7 resides 1n a series of 
nep.t1ollS, n04" oan an abstzaotlon readi11 be wo.rahipped: 
Be (GOd) J$\1' t we concede:, do these thiI)gs I s7ftlbolioal11 t • 
what..,.el' tlla'l ., mean, but we tell him 1n no unoertain 
terms that he wet not 11 t8.r&.11.1 do th.' Is this modest,. 
- Ol* is 1 t monstrons presmption' Have we tbis veto 
power upon dlvlnli,? Not to sustain relationships, not to 
respond sensitivel,. to the enstenoe of others, i8 to be 
. wooden, stupid. or an utterl;y empt1 a'bst.rao'U.on. It 1s the 
a\)8t1'&.01; whleh bas these nesative charaoteristios, not the ('H)l1Crete.... 18 Goa to be four:ul me.relJr in this d1.reot10n. 
looking toward the less and less oonoret.,15 
!he ~t'!.1l1~oloQ will .rather 'be in positive terms; m.ore spec-
If_ioal17. 1t will be stated qUs,ll'U.tatlvelY. This app.roaoh Will al-
low people to acttl8.111 unde.rstand what is being said .. rather than 
being lett lJ:? the throes of "D'G'ste.rY': 
The differentia at the new definition ~e that it is pos-
itive rather than negative, and that it is qQantltative 
r8the1' tban merely qualitative. It 11mits oOlDpa.rison between 
the create.r and the oreatures to d1ffe.renoes of degree. It 
• I .. 
unlve;!~i~i;:s~ri=T~ep*~ ~!.l!tts~e~:la;i,!lf- Raven, Yale 
13xaztshorne, "T11110h a.ud the other Great !f.radlt1on. n pp. 6-
'1; see also The R~~.~ ReJ.~tlvi t,l, pp. 10-19. 
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wl11 be admitted that relative or quantitative distinotlons 
are characteristio of sclentifio thought wherever it has 
been euocess1ul. But it is a OUl"ious :paJ."atlo% that in theol-
081 it is precisely the popular rather than the teohnioal 
oonceptiona whioh are the most ~iguouBll quantitative in 
meaning. Oontrast these (teohnical oonceptions), with their 
relative11 qualitative or negative oonnotations, - With suoh 
popular notions as almighty. all-knowing maker of all things. 
fbe OQmmGn basis of these latter descriptions is the quite 
positive and ~antltatlve idea of all-ness or total1tl. l4 
Hartshorne's oontentlon then is twofold: the tradltion whioh makes 
God in all .respeots absolute or unrelated aotually makes 1I1m less 
than perfect; this same tradition falls to make God eufflcientl7 
intelligible to the educated person and so does not suppl1 h1m with 
a proper objeot of worship. 
In ~e, Dirt.., a~lati11.tz. Hartshorne diStinguishes the mean-
ing of "perfect" and "absolute." Aocordi:ns to the prelimil:l.t.l.r1 def-
inition given aboTe" God is the Perfeot BalDS; but this is not the 
same as 881tns that God ls the AbsolRte Bel~. that ls. the being 
who ls entlre17 nonrelative.15 !~aditional 'tbeol081 has mlstaken17 
used "pert'eot" ln this double sense (w1thout .realising it) ana 80 
fallen into a dl1emna: 1f the Pel'fect Being sustains no .real. non-
essential .relations With 1mpel.'feot beings, lIe is less than the Pe.r-
feot-and-the-l:mpe.rfeot (that Is, the Pe.rfeot Beins as sustalning 
l4a'a.rtehorDe'. " Redefuing God'," Pp. e.9. 
15ua.rtshorne:, l2!! ~ivine Re;L!tlvltl. pp. 18-19. 
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such l'ela tlonsh1ps) J ihus God is actually le ss ihan Pe.r:tect Belng. 
an i:b8 othel' bal'Jd', lf the nonrelative Pel'teot Being lssaill to In-
olude aU the !!lues ot the imperfect (and so has no need at rel .... 
tlons With the lmpel'feot~, • God dld no good th1ng. when he created 
the wo.rld t and our huma.n exlstenoe 1s Jl'ltrtaphysloally tweless and 
mea:n.t ngle8s.ft16 If God actually includes all posslb1e Taltles, o1'e-
atures oan o01'1Ulbute noth1ng to m.. ana so are useless. 
Detm1l'l8 the Pel'tect Being as that 1.n4ivldual 'than which B!. 
othe.r11'1411'14_1 oould be peatel' avoids this d11Eumna. It GOd 18 
Inoue].atl" In so~ .respeots, ,but .rela~ive to the wo.r1d in othe.rs, 
Be oan inolude 1t. fte \'101'14, howGvel', ls tempo.ral and thus God 
must be tempo.ral also. !bu God at one time ls more pe.rfeot than 
Be ls at Goihel', beoause He inoludes e. g.reaie1' .reallty on some 
0008.8101'18 than on othel's, and so surpasses B1mself in p8l'fectio1'1 
fl'om one t1rna to anothel'.1' 
Row oan God inolude tbe world' lJl.l'tahorm agrees wlth tl'ad1-
tlonal thought when it says the. t God knows eve1',Ji;hiD8, Ol' 1s omnl .. 
801ent, this mans llte.rally that GOd knows eve.rJ1;hing that then 
is to be known; eve.r7thlng. that ie, wh10h nght 110\'1 is aotuall1' 
821stlns and so .e be known. But to know eometh1ng 18 to inolude 
1. t.18 Henoe GoA 1no1 uaes evv7thlns He knows - the whole wo.rld. 
16Ilri~ •• p- 19. 
17tb'4.~ p- 20. 
18J.bld., p. '6. 
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One might ask B!.rtsho.rll8 to explain \Vh; God met Bustain .real, 
nonessentlal .relations to the wo.rld in orda.r to know 1t. B1s ana-
\Ve.r, quite DIttntl..,. ls that "a.ctnal knowll'18 1s .relg.tl~ to what 1n 
pt..rt1oula.r _wens to ex1st and the.refore as enstent oan be known. 
But what in pt..rt1oula.r 1s known in a given krJ.l)wledg8 ls not in lie 
existenoe .relative to 'th1.e knowledge. It, theni. the known, o.r 01>-
~eot, 1s the non.relatift. &:nil knoWing or subJeot the .relatlve, fao-
tOl'i, &8 we haft Jut seen, must not GoI, 88 all-knowing', be np.reme 
17 .relatt verr19 T:batis, unless we 1I18h to tall back into the un-
lntelllgibll1t, of' analogical predloation, God' e mowlng muet be 
t.rea ted as o.f the same type as the knOWing we e:.rpe.rienoe. in whloh 
the one knowing is J:'ela tl va to what he mows. 
Anothe.r seem1l2s1;v .reasonable obJeotion is that if le88. 'falue 
1s belllS aold.eTed in the WOl'ld at one time than another, that ls, 
1t there 18 lese of ftlll8 to be Jmown in the .o.r1d .. will not God' s 
,e.r2eot10n dec.rease In comparison to its former state, 
This ob Jeotlon lpoJ:'ee tbe diTS.ne memOl'", whioh i8 of suoh a 
natu.rethat 1t .retains pe.rmanently whatever Goa at &n7 time knowe. 
The valuee known b7 God on one oooaslon beoome 1*.rt ot tis very 
being. 3ust as we J:'eoelve .real thol2.8h ac014enta1 boremenia to our 
being when we know obJeots. Thevaluea we aohieve pass away and 
a.re lost 1 God permanel'J:tly .retalns them in !Ii8 memo!"" howeyer. and 
tho# thus add to the perfeotion ne has alread7 ooma to possess in 
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mowing prertous values. Assuming that there is always more value 
in the world at ansr given time than disvalue (rather than that 
there is more disvalue. for tbe forme.r seems to be the aotual. Gase) 
God's perfection is an always inoreasing one. It The fiNt horn of 
the dilemma," lIartshorne remrks, "need not C01'lOe.Yn us, 1U1less it 
can be proved thla. t the.Y. 1s ever more sorrow the.n 307 in the wOl"14. 
Fol" if thel"s Is &11'1&78 mol'e satisfaction than dissatisfaction, then 
God should always haTe mol'e l"eason to l'e301ce than to grieve ovel' 
the world:, and since he can retain the oOllBclollSDeSS of past 307S, 
thel'e 1'1111 a1wa,8 be a Bert increment of Talu aco.ru1l'lg to God at 
...... to I 
eaoh moment. Ifow if llfe wel'e not more satlsf71D8 than othel'W1se, 
oould It go onY"!O God is the Pel"fect ,:Beins beoause Be poseesses 
mo.re values than a.n,y othel' indlvidua.l; fOlt B'e possesees the SWD 
tota.l of all values of all beings at aQ' one tlme. lIe l'etalns the 
values lie aoquu.-ee b; knowledse and so oontiXl'll&l17 stU'passes lH.m-
self 1n pel'tection. 
This tntel'preta.tlon of "pel'feot" makes God both intelligibltt 
and worshipful. RelfU:diDg the fizst pOint, B'a.Ytshorne acknowl. 
edges, wlth traditional theoloS;, that God 1s omniscient, for ex-
ample; but th1s omnisoience takes on a new neanlng. "Omnieoienoe 
is knowledge that is in some sense equal to lts ob3eots, 1t21 or cap-
able of knOWing them pel'fectl1', while nonamnisclenoe 1s not thus 
2O:sa.rtahomel , 1!h,e Riv1S! R.elati-v:~tl, p_ 46. 
211b14 •• p. 120. 
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equal. Omniso1ence is an abstract perfectlon. or the generallsation 
from a set of conaret. instances of perfeot knowing of lndividual 
0'b.1ects.22 Fwthe,r, Godts knowledge of the wo.rl~ oannot be constl .. 
tu.ted by a. "s1ngle Inclusive and unique JlelatlOl1,lt eyen though "lts 
tem 1s the one totality of belng," beoause w. flnd aotuallties and 
poienUal! tles 11'1 the world. Eaoh _at have a corresp0n41ng tn-
of adeqa.a.te mowl.edge, the aotual known as actual and the potential 
known as potenUaJ..23 But what is at one 'time potential becomes 
actual, hence a new knowledge of the actual as 8110h must be estab-
lished if oognltive adequaoy 1s to be maintained. The same applies 
to the potential as suoh. To define 11 omrdsQienoel1 as adeq1.'lAte 
knowledge of what aotually exists as aotual, and of what potentla.l-
lJr exists as potential'. necessitates posltll'lg the temporaU.ty of 
God. Jo.r omnisoienoe ls then reoo8ll1sed as an It W1n1te class of 
!.relationships," 1n that an omnlsoient being knows adequatel3' eaoh 
totallty sepa.rately as lt pleaents itself to be known. This in:tln-
1 te class has the oommon ohazaoteristlc of "adequacy, n whlch prop. 
en), 1s not!, hOl'leTer, .relatlve to the objects mown, as are the 
conca'e exemplifications of "oosn1 t1 ve adequBC7. ,,24 
God's perfeot1ons, in the liSht of this analysis. take on a 
d.Dl oha.racte.t'. In Bls abstmot natve God is absolute (or 'tIll.rela-
22;}J&d.', p. 121. 
23xbld. 
t r A 
2~,b&d. 
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ted to' the world) in Ble p9l"teotions; Ii1s caplolt7 to'· &iiequatell' 
know eve.rl'thil18 ls entuely nna1'feoted by other th1118s. In as 
concrete mtue Be 1s not only relative. but the JnC)st .relative of 
being s, Since lalQ'lls dge ef all things deJlll9.llas dependence on all 
things. Ged cannot know a value whlch someone creates ~ss that 
person actueJ.ly Cl"sates 1t. God's e:nrlohment of His being by kn(M' .. 
Ins and possesa!.ng value em.s .relatiVity) thus dependa entl,rel.v en 
Bls ol'eatv •• ' acttTltiea and lI1sown conorete aot1v1t1es in asets-
t~ ~mtocna._lue. 
Acool'tU.ng to B'a.rtshe.me's conception, then, God has all the 
pel'feotlol'ls asoribed to' Blm b7 t~adltlO'nal thought. as abat1'8ct 
pel'fectlens 0'1' .realO8.l!:cl t14U, OJ.' :e<tt,e~l:al.l.tles which cannot be 
affectea. by ethel' beings; at the same time He possesses mOl'e value 
1n m.e oono.retG natu6 than any ethel' indiv1dual (even 11 the world 
is taken as an lniU,vldu.al', for Be posaessea all the values o.reated 
in the world) ad so is the tl'Ul1 Pel'feot BelJl8. 
The .religious TaluS at God, on theothe.r hand, 1s not 4 ea-
t.royed b1 B1s .relatlT1t7 aDd H1.s dependenoe 011 lIis o.rsatlU'es. 
lil.l"tshOl"DfJ oom;onds tblt "for the present, 1 suggest that all we 
oan assert to ."v. obvious .relig10us value is the fal th that Goi 1s 
to be r911e4 upon to do for the wOl'ld all that ought to be done tnt' 
1 t, and w1 th as much su.rvel' of the future as ths.re ought to be o.r 
as 1S 148al17 des1l"able."25 Omnisoience in the sense of a totum 
• 
t. • I ,.1' 1/1' 
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s~ knowledge or nontea;o~al knowing (ana consequent o~dezing) 
of the 1'101"14 1s not requ1..red for e. wozsh1pable God; lnaeed, thls 
oonoeptlon has caused oonslderable ..religious diffioultles.26 For 
1t, for example, God mows ever.Yf;h1118 that 1'1111 happen, how oan Be 
allow evil to ooou.r and stl11 be called 800d? This single d1fflo-
ult7 1s enoqh to show us that all that relig10n needs 1s a God 
who knows wbat th8n 1s to be mown (all aotual and possible ..real-
1 ty !!. o..rwl~.q 1 t is aotual o..r possible) and a 10Ying o.rdezins of 
the wo.rld in aooordanoe with that lalowledp. Of oourse, because 
God does not know pe.rfeotly what will happen, evils do oootu'; but 
e shoUld not expeot the imposs1ble. 
God fa t..radl tlonal re11810u8 perfeotlon 1£1 not only maintained, 
ut even mueased, by panenthelsm. Oeneid • .r the follow1ng situa-
tion. God t S 00l10..rete P8.rt801;10n aepends on the values He knows 
adequate17 (and thus possesses h but these ftlues are orea:ted by 
B1s ozeatu.res 1n the wozld. 1'he .... efo.r. God's CHain.r.s oan oontrl-
bute to lt1s pezteotlon. ney can ohoose 01' ~etuse to ozeat. val:l1e 
fo.r God to know and pOSHsst 
What 1s the inoluslve value of human life? Is lt human wel-
tue onl7' Is 1t the "glozit1oatlon" ot God defined as so 
oomplete17 absolute that 1 t must be beyond OU pOWe1' ",0 Con-
tzlbute to his s.rea.tnees? A new eft in .re11810n _,. 'be p.re-
dieted as soon Be men grasp the ldea that 1t 18 3uet as true 
that God ie the supreme beneflc1a.ry OJ.' .r8011191'1t ot aohieve-
ment, henoe supremely .relative to all aclaev.« aotualities. 
as that he 1s the supreme benetaoto.r or source ot achieve-
ment. and in eo tar nonrelatlve to its ze8U!Mtu~ has 
;. .. 1 \ S 0 \"1 £' ~'''' ~~ '~~'\ 
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bee. a !leo.ret polson 10»8 wo.rld.nS in .rellsloue thou;ht ana 
teellD8. the polaon of man'. wantins to be an ultimate .re-
olltent ot Talue. Reli8ion then beoomee mab's eelt-ee~1oe. 
not sen1'l1lle17 hi8 .enloe of God. :ro.r it Goc1 orm 'be indebt.' 
to 110 0Jl!', 0aJl noel ... e ... alue t.rom no one. then to spealt of 
.e.n1.ng um 18 to b14\1lge in equ.1vooatlon.l , 
Bariahor:ne' a basto oOMep'llon of God 18 aependent in 1.'8 o.rlsin on 
tile Mstonoal meard.q of "God" &8 the Pel'teot Debg. OJIDlaos.ent, 
all.,. ..... ful. all-10Ylns. 1*l'e.41 ttonal tho118h:t ha4 _de the.e ab-
.'bact ,. .... 1801;lona into oono.ret. pe.rfeotloae and thus had &888 .... te4 
the al,..olate.a. o.r no.e1&t1'9'tt7 of G04. But the t.radltltmal Joe-
ltion e.I'e4 in tMa .re,a.rd. God'. abe",",ot ,..tfeotlona &1'e 8X •• -
»11ftea in o01lUe1;. "lations of taowlug f 10Ylns. w1l11l1s; Be 1. 
abet.raotlJ'a'baolu"e but oOl1o .... et.17 .. latl,.e. Beoopta1Jl8 tMs p ...... 
e..,fte BI t.ra4t tlemal _anlnB as Pe .... feot Bel. (thoup tn a new 
. ea •• ) a8 ... 11 a8 enhanolns Be .r811,101.1s Tal_. 
Bartahol'D8 has 81Y8a .. hat he cODalae!'e a oohe .... en'l. poaltt ... e17 
..... lIlSf'&ll 4e:t1nt'lon of Qoa~, be81mlq w1't;h what men have said 
about Blm. olaaaltnns tk1a, abstl'aotl.DB the 8sBent;lal feature., 
ead wo.rk1n8 tham lnt, a ooh ... 8.t oonoeptlon. l3ut alDoe be 0021a14. 
e.r8 his wo.rk an effo1't in metaph7alo8 .... atbe.r than me .... e17 a pleoe 
of hiatarloa1 ....... a.roh. his next atep 18 to pl'Oft tJaat the oonoep. 
'llon he haa &1'1'1v.4 at baa an ontol081cal ooate .... :pu.-t. !L'hoUSh 
.e"l'al _oofa &.1'8 oneoraa. ..e wl11 0011.14el' ot1l.7 the two .e 0021-
8148l.' tbe m08t tOl'oeftt1. 
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Jra.l'tshol'ne· iii Ontological A1'gnJMllt 18 'baRd. on hia a.finS. tlon 
otthe 41'f'tJte pa.rteotloxu "Goa cannot oanoelftb17 be su.rpusae4 or 
equaUed br aZl,)' othel' uutl'f'1dual, 1"1" Ife can 8Vpa8. hlmeelt. alJA 
thus lila aotca.al .'ate 18 not the Inateat possible .ta,.. fh1s s... 
pli •• that tlte.re 18 po"entiaUt7 as well as a01n.11'7 in the d1'f1.l1e 
.real 1 '7. "18 fti8 CU .. ffU8 n4loa117 fIt_ what ~tsho.me oalls the 
.. claast.oal loot.f'ine." ill wUch G04 1.8 ,. UolU81vel.r aotl1A1." !he 
neoela8.1oal .reaeflnitton. h .. ,.. ... 18 tn. t.rom tile 10810&1 Ittfs'. 
O1I1t1 •• of tke olaseloalJ ta.l-the.f', it s'8 no le •• a prlo.rS, (tllat 1., 
doe. Dot les_ tile n808.81 'li7 of GOd' 8 e%lstcmoe) than ,. olus-
loa1; OOllt1l1pnt »,0,.1"1". an predicated of Go4:", but !lot oontln-
,ent e21ateuoe.2, 
file Ill .. Goe1lent a 'being la. tbe peateI' potentlalltle. it 
has, a man 0 .... 81eot '1118 oveel' 01' that', 'but an ape 0 ... '1.80 
G04 can o.ra .. te thls ,,0.r14 o.r that. but 8UOh 18 not possib18 for 
men.31 'be olaa.loal ,,"'w hell ,hat no mattu nat Gel 414, .. 
.re-.1n&d 1mo1lat1lea. "On tbe ala.sieal new, allJ' othe.r wol'14 o.r 
1 P 
28autahOm&. l'!I.!.l6Ii" !1 Pal'feotlop. p. 36. 
2~)14. 
SOXbll. 
81I):»1".. p. 36. 
., 
" ... woa.14 _n .stull.ea the T8~1 same at&te of 41'f1..ne 10'f'G ana 
tnowlease."· !he tn.th 1s that 1t G04 18 Pe.rteot Being, me pot. 
eDtlalltle. a..re peate.r than th()sa. 01' an:T othel" betns. "~e 41't1.D1 
powe..,-t~4e 18 absolllteJ.3r 1n.f1n1t.t or i8 all pow .... t. "'e."33 G04~ 
In taot'. ooiJlo14ee Wi til posaibili t7 !! arqoll-M 1l'! the same JII!lM.e.tr. 
Be 00lnoS.48. tt1. til aotllall t7 1.8 such. nia la oalle4 God' 8 ao4al 
00uo14_oe,. Jfa 001l1014e. "I'-'lt. o.r Is. th ..... modea of 'belng 
fMtuali tJ' Ulfl po .... tl611 Q). 
AOOW4iq to Beob ... ,,' a Postulate, JJa.rtsho.rne 078, " •• 41.1 ataf:. 
~8 OaB be aftllaed 0 ... lentea in the moa. of ne.8salt7 on17,,,36 80 
tllat Goi t • ulat ... 18 not a 9;\18.f:1011 of oontlD8ent enatanoe 
oppoaed t. oODtilllel1' noa-exiatenoe. but of De ••• a&rJ aSa "eno. 
oDoaH to _oesaar,. l1on-eua"enoe •• ' _, If God is aotualt t7. 
_at ooUld oon08t"""17 OauS8 tim to 08 ... e to euat' on17 that be-
tns on Wbloh Be a.,.Ma to. Be extateDoe; but tf the ... a i8 noh, 
thls othe1" b8hs ia God. What oou14 0011oe2:rab17 oauae nm to ex-
liat!. If m. 4088 Dot alnad.v exlet' J'o.r th1e .rea8011. to apeak of 
~- o01'1tSnsent17 .. natil'll Pe.rteot Belns is .a oOl'1f:1"adlo .. o .... ' &8 to 
881"14,- t p. 3'. 
~;td.!. 
i4DI.~.i. p. sa. 
Hn&.t. 
~'bl4.t p. at. 
8'1'Pl4,. t p. so. 
3' 
apeak of the non-exist.ai Perfeot Being. If PG.rteot lloUg 8.x18t. 
oontingentl;. o.r does not enst, lie is not Perfeot Be1ng .. 88 
The fo.nal proof ie as follows: 
1) It Pen.at Beins eslsts, it necGaaa.:tl1,. aleta. 
2) ISS.the.r lt l'lfHleasa.rll7 e:xlsts, OJ' it neci/uum.rl11 doeB not 
enet. 
S) If 1t necessarily does not exist. it 1s neoeGsarJ that it 
nooes8al'Uy does not enst. 
4) Thus. eithel' it neoeBaarl1;, exists, o.r it 115 n8(188_1"1 iha1 
it doe8 not o%1st. 
5) If ,the latter, then 1t ls n()o(uUJS.~l that it d.oes not exlst. 
S) S0,. iteithe.r necessarily exists. or 1t 1s necessary that 
1t does 1101; exist, 
'I) We intuitivel,. know that l't 1s not necessuy that Pe.rfaoi 
Being not e:dst (It 18 not Impossible). 
8) Thus 1 t 18 Deoesea,z.-;v that it enst. 
9) But 1f this 1s cO', 1 t 8nats. 
. . 
10) Pe .. teo1 Belng. o.r God, ex18ts.19 
Step (1) does not -7 'that God's non-exlstenoe 1s oont!'ad1otOl':;. 
but l"athe.r that If God ex1sts. lio must do so necessarily o.r lIe 1s 
not GOd: so-oalled "Pertect Be1nS" whioh onsts oontingentlY' 1s 1n 
l"oallt1 an !mpc~feot be1ns. 40 
In su.mma.ry ;tC»:'nt, the 1l1*lfument atat&8 that 1) perfeot1on must 
, 1 r 1t Wi 
3&rbid. See also the seotion ent1tled tlThe Inaompa't1'bl1ilY' of 
Fel"feet~and Oontingenoy t~ pp.. 58-6a. 




necessarl1y exlst, if at all; 2) if non-existent, It is necessarll~ 
so; 3) if nec.seari11 non-existent, perfeotion 1s imposs1ble; 4) 
but e.rfeotlo:q .!! Eossible. 41 Vie oa.n oohe.rentl.1 oonceive of Pel'-
feot Beins; we oan oonceive of God as Hutsho.rne has done. 5) Pel'-
feotion is not impossible, therefore It is DeOessarl. God eXists. 
This }artloule..r fo.rm of the Ontological Argument oannot be 
used to prove the e:xistence of a God of the olas81cal type because 
the 018881oa1 oonoeptlons are full Qf oontra410tlOl1s. or "para-
closes, tt th118 not ooherent17 co:ncelvable t the; do not show the non-
impo.siblli', of Goa·s existence: 
Anselm' a Ilost nlne.rable assumption. so far as we 
see, 1s his belief that tbe idea of an absolute ms.:rlmum of t.reatne88 1.8 oonslstently meanil1l!fU1, tbat posl tlnall is noo.rreot. Row does he know "l!B%imal s.reatnesa" 1s not 
81mllar to It. numbez thall which none gl'eateJ." oan be con-
ceiTed"' (No such maximal number 1.s concelvable.) onlY' a 
sltghteffort is made by the gzeat Bishop to meet this 
dlfficult1. that Is, to ~fute poeltlV1sm. ••• Indeed, 1t 
1s hud to see how classical theism. with its pa.rado:xloal 
view of delt" could ever establish the eonslstenc~ of lts 
baslo 001'108,1;101'1. 42 
Only the l'leoolassloal oonoep1;lon of God, tn whloh Be ooincides 
with aotu.allty as suoh ana potentiallt1 as suoh, 18 oohuentl;v 
conceivable. and so the on1~ oonoeptlon 0: God whlch oan use th1s 
proof to show BS.s ex18tenoe. 
4lIbid,., p. 52. 
42lJal'tshorM and Re ese t Ph &l,os0E!!e.t:,s, SE!ak!! GOd. p. 103. 
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All oontlnse:nt proposl tlons are .restrlot1Te: .. e always find 
that "This ls the faot, instead .2! that." Alternative possibtli-
tles oonflict one with tbe other and thus exolude the realization 
of the others. Some propositions, on the other hana, "are oom]Jat-
lble with anr poeltiTe and oonsistent assertion whatever, name11 
necessary p.roposltlons."43 The existenoe of Perfeet Being 1s one 
of these propositions. "(Iod exists"" 1s tolerant of any state ot 
affairs. But GOtt's 1UliTe.real enstential tolerance, it may be ob-
jeoted. does not prove that God ex1sts. 44 Bartsho.rne answers that 
If GOd's non-e%istenoe bas no posltive signifioanoe (te.r "God ex-
ists," as well as "God,eGes not exist." 1nte~8re8 with the 8xis-
1;&n08 of nothlll8 else). this non-e;g1.stenoe would be a pu.rel.v nega-
tlTe faot whioh oould in no way be ve.rlf1ed. But a negatiYe faot 
always asse.rta something posl tlTe; 1. t 1s only pat'tlall1' l"eetJ!'lotl T8 
(unless lt 18 e false statement, 11lte "J'othlD8 ensts"). What is 
thie SOmttthlng pos1tlTe whlch 1s asse.rted by the absence of delty 
which we coUld ue to ve.r1fy the statementt 
The f~l a.rsument 1s as follOW'St a oontingent oonce])t is OM 
whose uelll,Pll:tloatlon OJ!' non-exemplltioat1on 1s :possible. l} All 
such comepts a.re pa.rtlally .restrlotl'f'e; that ls. theil' e:l'empllfl-
43lJaJ.'ts~OJmet. !l'he !:..w.~ .0.1. ;l!eJ.',~eot2:.ctl!. p. e8. 
'':t}d,a. t p. '10. 
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cation 1s 1ncompatible w1th some othel' po.sltlve poss1bll1 t7_ 2) 
The; oonoept of Pel'feot :Be1ng is wholl" non-.reet.rlotlve:, "1 t8 8:xem-
p,~ifloatlon being compatlble with 1ihe extstenoe ot an; poal1ilve17 
Jonoeiftble state of atfal.r'h"45 3) The oonoep1i ot Perfeot )3&il'l8 
/ 
llilonoontill8en1i, "God exists" is e1 tbel' impossible 01' neoessal'l /' 
(Anselm's usigbt). But "nothing is st1'101;11 imposs1ble 1Dlless 1t 
1s 1l1he.ren1i17 oonva4ioto .... 7 01' meaninsless."46 4} B&1'tshome's 
oonoept10n ot God 1s ne1 the .... oont1"8410t01'7 nor taIltant,Dgles8; there-
to.re God neoessa.r117 ex1sts. 
Both thi8 p.roof and the Ontological P.roof. 1t m18ht be noted, 
are based. d1.reotl), on an insisht or intuition into the natve ot 
God: "Anselm'. lntu1tlon wsa that God exists 1n a supe.rlor 1lIU1l'1er. 
the o.rdln.a.r7 'flay of ensting being a defect."" :troJ."' '.8th!. tntu .. 
i U d I • 
' .... b .. d.; '0 "'~,'" ." p. . .• 
46tb~!.; see also P1>- 92.108. 
47Bartsho.rntf, ~ ~S!C. Of Pe.r!eotlon, p •.. ·58 •. -Reds Jol1'9'et. 
lab!ed;. R.f. ieasoirTJtew !o.rlt; !iw~lio.t:11 !ooks. 1968). pp. 46-4'1i lD&nl!O:ne eimIla.rU'lhat "the [ontological] altgument eeems to lap y 
It t,he.rotlsh undeJ:fBt8J1dlng of the lJDler .req111.remente of the :1.4_ of 
God'. of a betns in whom essenoe a.nd a:d.stenoe a.re not .real17 41s-
tlnot and are onll one thins. 80 moh eo that he ..... , com.ra.r1 to 
what .18 t.rue of the .rest of .reall ty t to grasp an. es. senoe 1s equ1y. 
alen:t to appZehendtns an ex1etehoe 111 .1t$ ,..111 nec.ssltr_ It i. 
preoisely this point on whioh Desoa'1te"i"'1ia:s moe' Il1BIsted. aanng 
·that his &l'gtunent does not start froll the wo.rd "God", but f.rom & 
.real and obJeotive essenoe OJ.' nature t and henoe alwe.ye .remains. 
fl"OJn 1ts begltm1ng (tbe natue of Goul tolte ftAt'ltt'1t11 1i1Ion (the 0'1.· 
tenoe of GOd)'. in the real orde.r. (See Descartes, J~.. . ;: au 
P.rem1e.res obleotlons t seotion 12.) Wh6teTe.r -7 be Ii,,,n ~th. d'al'iesraJi vIew,' '1!iI's 8S:p&ot of the ontological a.rsumel1t nakes 1t 
cl.~ that 8t. Thoms who had refuted the ueelmiaZ1 ~oot beto!'. 
Kant, was fa.r fl'Gm tahiBup a purely negat!Y. atti tail. towa.rda It. 
1 tion put fOl'th as ... thing rarely enoOlUlteHd, but .raihe.r as -
expe.rlenoe oOJllllon to all men.48 
:row that we have outlined HartshoJ.'ne' e 'baaio phllosophy and 
his philosophy of God!, we a..re in a position to of'iel' aome or1t1-
clam. 
T , .. nt _, •• "\ 
if the asseJ.'tl0zf, "Go! ·enstsn , he _78', :1.8 not and oannot be a El'l~e evidenoe foJ.' 11B, in itae1fl that ls, f.rom the standpoinT of 1'1 t God's nature demands it s eY1deznthat God exists, since 
eS.sence and enstenoe belng identioal in hh1, he oannot not exist." 
4:8of. B'arishornet, Befond Ba:mll.nie~ pp. 284-285; quoted in 
Ohapte.r I. note 46 (p. rr 0' mIs l'lieale. 
OlIAPTER III 
A. lIE!l!A.PJII8IOAL OPTIONS 
!WO :proble_ aom1ua.te 1TA.l'tehome I e :ph11osoPh11 f!..rs1f. h. oan 
we haTe a meatdDsfrll ,,"pb1s1os: seoondi• bOllf 00 we epaaJt _an1ng~ 
ful17 about G04' Sinoe _ta~sloe 18 an eftort to speak about al~ 
of .reality \Ultle.r 80~ unita.rl' aspeof. ana s1JlO8 God 18 at leut a 
pa.rt of that .real1 t7. his ph11oeopbJ' of God 18 intlmatell' oOnt1ectel 
with and depenlent on hls bul0 _-Ph!vsloal p081tions. This RIa. 
tl01UJld., holas t.ru.e especially 111 ..... gard to Ba.rtshom.'e _ihod of 
prooedue. In B!I,lond l!u!@!d:slI. 'lore_aple', .. .read that ph1loso-
phi besll'l8 with obee.na.tlOl1 of eellsible reality_ wAe _n loolta 0111 
upen the .o.rldl• he .eee ••• the animals ••• the p1ar.tta ••• lno.rgan1o 
01:l3&ot8.,,1 !1te phl10soPhe1' f1n48 that -the". aeem to be two g.reat 
, , 
olasses of eXlstel1te,"2 oJ'Sam.o ana ll:l.Orpnlo thlnse. Appa.rel1t17. 
t18 metapJuraioal effart is stiflea at the beSixmlltg; "allt,. do.s 
Dot preeent 118 wlth a 1Ullta.ry aS18ct which mlsht be SAsped, ex-
plored, enlar,ea upon to gift one bod7 Gf latOWladS8 about all 
• I • ... 
lOharle8 lra..r. tahoma, :se,ona mu-nlem( Ohlo&80 and .. York, 
Wlllett, Ola.rk and Oompa.D7, 13", p. tIL 
2Ib1.4• 
tbbaaa. lnat.aI? .. 8 'llnd a baste 41,,181021 1n "eallt7_ 
At tMe 'JOin". then 81'8 two optlcma.,... on the one haD8:. 
"8 OaB proo.ed. .8 BartW.ftl8 doe., to .re4uoe all r.&1I.:_ to 0l'1. 
t7P8 o.r OlaS8., Be .. e:ma.rm that'" the". are lood reasons, howen", 
to.r tJat.:atlDf! that 1l1orsam..u a.re a1mp17 &88ft8&t •• of ,..,t. ole 
.... tlae •• l ..... 0.raet. .... ,,8 Slnoe ... tkiDs. are 01l1'101l817 DOt 
O!'IWO. ao ...... Ol'1able .. wOUld .&7 tltat the,. uel but l' 18 DO' 
qut. 80 o'bnoua that tlte .. tld.DlS are G.tt.re17 blarp.rd.o. Pe.rhaJY 
the, &1'. 00llpo .. 4 of o.r,alo pa.rts. P • .rhapa thel' the.elves are 
])&l'ts of a lus",. 1110"'8 lJlolustft Hall t1 whloh 18 0I.an10. Jlu't ... 
home 'Ulan _GOea48 t. flail .1'_1110_1 81'_I1'S to _pport a •• 
supposltions ... ooul114 •• 'llat 81lOh a.nlnte.rp.re"'tlo1'1 of ... eallt,. 
18 poaa1ble. 
Bu.' l' .nal17 oup' to be aattt. 111 GnUoS.. of 'Ma, t]at 
the t.raeltion l.r_ the p08albUlt7 8t noh an lDterpre.tlO1'1 to 
tt8 _0 ••• lt7 .reat. on w. aa81l1lPtlo;ns. De ft.ra' t8 that we 40 
no' tala1t7 01U!' YlalOJl of .rea11 "7 b,. ueatl:ns t1dn •• as tholtlh the~ 
aU fell lata .. 01&8.. rue d8l:Ulptlon is e.peo1a117 _.1'4 ... 
slue .. an OOd.ronte4 at the ou' •• ' wt. at l ... et two olae_. of 
thinS-, U. a.nSma'h &D4 the bani.'-. anA ruth." f..D.'ftetl,atlon 
alsh' •• ".. .. 1 nhe, olaa.8 u "ell. Plants, fv example, .8e. to 
be b ... loa117 liff.,e.' f.ro. ant_le._d raUl f1'om o,he .... au1rra1e, tc 
_,. nothing of ,_ alatino'lon otten pos1'.d betw •• n _tulAl uut 
I b It * 
l .. te~l bes.nslh 
!he vs.eWJOint that woUla .reduce all t1d.ngs to. oneolass, as 
Ba.rtahom.e 1lfoUlll do. impllcl t17 aftl.rme that 1*ea11 t7 oannot be re-
duced to oonoeptual un!. t1' 1U1les8 we ttJ>st tln4 somethlXl8 111 all 
J>ea1 thins. to Be"e as a basis tol' thla conoept 01' .t of con-
eept_. lUll.aa .e tll'st tlnd some essential cha.raotel'latio8 oommon 
. , 
to aU thlng., ~ impose such cha.racte1"lstlos on them, in the eYen 
of lack ot olear GY14enoe. trow this 1s quite 001"1"80t; suoh a pro-
cedve. to 'be auoo8ssful:, has illat neoess&r7 preoondl tton. But 
hOW 18 the :pIrOGedure Itself justifled? ?Jhat do we flnd in real 
thlngs that woUld allow u to afflrm that its eoncep_l uni t7 ls 
possible' HartShorne operates 1n ~the.r a oi.raular Bannel" heze; 
he til'st eoneeptua~l,. 1U11tles .... ea1it,.. then 8als t.t 1t 1s P08S-
ible. 13,· possible,· howeYcu:,", he oan onl7 mean that 1t 18 posslble 
&s a h1uaan ao1;lY1ty, not as a t.rue and valld 1nte1"pretatiOl'1 of 
.reallty. :lro.- if he meant "posslble" in this latte... sellSe, he 
woulc1 111*s1; llave to lnvet'rU.gate that questlon and ask, ·What 1s 
tlle.re in .real 'Ud.l'188 that leads me to balleve that they are all 
melib"8 of one 01&88' Is thel'e aotuall; a;a.vthlng, 01" has J1'CV de-
sl" to know .r8.11ty unAe .... some unlta.rl' aspeot been guIded in the 
• .rong 41reot10Ji. a dueotlon mol'e au1 ted to the ph7810al 801entlat 
. Am I not oontu.e1ns the method propel' to pbJS108 wi. th the method 
pzope.r to metaphyslosf' If Hartshome could a.tlS1'Ie1' that welSht7 
ertdenoe led him to beUeve all things we.re membe.rs of one olaS8. 
well and 10Od, but since he finds that .reallt7fo.rme at least two 
45 
olasses, the organio and the lnorganic, 1 t is doubttttl prooedue tc 
torm the hYpothesis that all inorganl0 things are somehow organlo, 
oonsolidate tbe notion, and argue from that basia that the~e may bE 
only one olass. The faot that he has made this interpretation doeE 
not mean thBt the p,rooedUl'e is valld. The neoeSS&l"; oondition for 
the statement, "All reality may be organle," is the sta:tement, "AIJ 
reality rna; fall into one olass" _. whioh, as he notes, is oont~a­
dleted by experienoe. For this reason, interest1ng as 1t ls. h1s 
metaphysios oan be no moze than a hypothetioal construction wl thoni 
any solid founBation in reality. 
But havins aooepted this" one...class" interpretation of real-
ity, Hartshorne prooeeds to say that Onll l!! set! of charaoteris-
tios could possibly be used as metaphysioal variables, or oharac-
teristics whioh oould be pred.ioated of all things: the first is the 
set of var1ables emplo18d 1n physios; the seoond, those employed 1r. 
oomparative psyohology. (These seem to be oorrelative with the twe 
great classes of existents, the inorganio and the organic.) The 
patent impossibility of using the first eet 1n metaphysics arises 
from the fact that some things are organiC ana have psychological 
oha.raoterlstios; but, in alldlt1on, Ibrtshozne sta.tes that the first 
set. those used in physios, "are not a d1fferent set" fram those 
~sed in psyohology, "but the same set with oertain aspeots al-
tered.*,4 Be argues that "the space-time structures deal with by 
'Ibid. 
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physios, beil'lg the dynamio patterns of the \vor14, do not of them-
selves answer the question, Patterns of what?' Physios tells us 
A2!. reality interaots. but not w~a~ reality is. Thus we must oon-
clude that It the 'psychic' Tariables ••• are simply all the variable! 
with unlimited range,"S and alone qualify for applioation to a 
reality with a Similarly unlimited range. 
The second option open to the prospeotive metaphysioian faced 
with an apparent dichotomy in the things of experienoe agrees with 
Hartshorne's inSight that "all va.riables. whatever else they nay 
be. must be va.r1ables of hunan eXpel'lenoa."6 and that "it is not 
the funotion or within the oapaoity of external peroeption to te1l 
us wh8:~ things are. but onlY' to tell us where they_ •• are. in how 
small or large an area. and how they aJ.-S ohanging their .relative 
pOSitions.It '1 But the Tieli \vh10h we affirm interprots this latte.!' 
statement differently than Hartshorne does. He says that sinoe ex-
ternal peroeption does not tell us what things are, the only oonr~ 
open is to turn to internal perception ("self-peroeption, intuitiVE 
g.!'asp of the lUli tary nature of our experience" e >. generalize on 1. ta: 
essential oh&.raoterlstloa and apply them to all things. 1n order tc 
5lbid. 
SIbid. 
"Oharle$ Hartshorne, "Pannsyoh1sm," in A HistOl.'t of Phl1osoEh-
loalSlstemeJ. edt Vergillus Fem (lJew York, 1J1i1!oaop ical*miarl. 




haft a metaph,Jslcs. (Apin, extel'.l pe.roept 10n seems to be oo.r-
.relat1ve with 1no.rgan1c th1nge and the 1"&I1ables of phys1os, In-
terDal pG"oeptlan with o"gan1o th1nge and the PGJoholog1oal ~­
ables.) !!'h1e 18 tne 0Dl.7 1f estel'nal p$l'oeptlon 1s oonside.red 1n 
1solatlon ~om man's othel' oognit1ve powe"., notab17 the intelleot 
111 the oon01"ete s1tuat10n. howeY.". men know tlWl8s nth both the 
1ntelleot ana theu se_ee. know thil18s pe1'oeptual17 and 1nte11eo-
tuall7 at 'the ... tlme. 1'l11e sort of knowledge doe8 tell \l8 what 
thinss &.re and "emows the neoessltJ' of loold.ll8 fol' Ute "1'1hat" of 
things b7 oompa.riJ18 them with the 1ntl11 t1"17 lalO\U1 human essenoe. 
au..... prooedne rill show this "" a.rl'S:v1J18 at a set of Ya.rla'ble 
applloable to all~h1118s but Bot deJ.'1ved t.rom the seJ1eft.l ohuao-
'e1'1st108 of bDman eXp&l'lenoe (as Baztsho"De'. are). 
All th1nge are ob1"1oo17 Bot JnEuibe"s of one olass. Aooept1na 
thls essential 41eslmllu1 t7 of thll'lSs. we oan ask 1f the"e 18 not 
sometld.ns mo"e bas10, mo.re fmtdamental. th&u the essenoes Of 
tMDSe. ftoqh thls questlon has p,robab17 .raGelft. "nd' :to&" an 
anewal' JDaJO' times 1n the past, '-'hOMe Aqll1.:r1as states aff1.ltJBtS:"el1 
that a thlll8' s exlstenoe 18 more tu.:n4amental tha.a 1 t8 e ssenoe, 
mon basl0 to a thins than what it 1~. 1s the faot that 1t .L" 
fhis 1s so beoa.use lU'11ass a thlng ls,. 1t oaamot be tld.s 01' that. 
o.rptd,o o.r lno.rsan1o, A metaph7sios whioh ptooee4s trom the faot 
ot a thins'e existenoe does not eliminate the o.rSanio-1norSan1o 
dlchotomr we enoounte~ed at the beglnnins or our lnveatlgatl~. 
but, while l"esp1)otlng it, goes beyond it.' 
This mtaJ>h7alos can. t~ example, dzaw these oonolusions 
abon t J:'eall t11 sinoe both olAsses at thinss enst. they shaft in 
the qualities ot goo4ms., t.ruth, unity; because theyex1st in. a. 
11m!. ted ~". • .ratioml nectessi tles dictate that the;, .ve a ,oa. 
for both the1.r enste'llOe and the llm1tedmss of theu ex1stenotGs. 
These oharaoterlstlcs, whlle oertainly being applioable to or~o 
things. a.r8 flot 11m1 ted to them, but oan be applied to inorpn:1c 
things as well. B7 going be:lond tm essenoes at thblss, a met .. -
ph;Vs10s oa.:n be establlshed whloh does not .reduoe all .reallt,. ttO 
olass; thls mtaph.ysics, :ra.r.e.r:rDO.l'G. need not take as a atpp0J81 .. 
tlon that .reality.!!Q be .redalce' in such a way, fv 1t b~n)c!UuJe. 
that proaedve. 
:r..et u "turn fo.r a moment to OQ.\' sta.rtlng point. our pt'tOble 
ls the aam.e as IfA.rtshorne's ... Bow 18 a .uLl'llfl8f'a.l metapb,ys1cB 
90t. thomas Aquinas, S!estle>nes DtsPTlatae De Potent~a. nl 
2, ad 9; tZ6fl8latea b7 James .. '. me!'8. In l'if.r§!uoWn '''0-''-
.ta . S 08 of at. ~Aq1d.Das (Ohlcago. JiU7 lesner,-, l~ 
p_ : ' t-r Oiil 8ase ~s among all prlno1plee the moet pe.rfGO\' 
hlah Ie en,dent troll He faot that aot 1s r;.lwa18 mol'e pe.rteot 
thaD potent1a11 t7_ NoW. B.D7 deslgnated tom 18 un481'stooil to .:det 
aotuall), only In Y1,rtue of tbe taot that It Is held to be. Tba&r. 
h'l1mfU11 tl" or 'lue oan be oo1'1e1d8.r84 as enst1ng in the pole1'1t1alU. t7 
of matter. 01' as eXS,st1nB 11'1 the acttye power 0'1 an asent ~ a180 
as exist1ns in an intelleot. But that whloh hae eese ls ,£.e aotbual 
1. t;v of all acts, ana for this reason 1 t 1s the perfection of alll 
perfections. Bor 1e it to be thought that somethtns 18 added tCD 
hat I oal1 eese ftS.oh 1s mo.re formal than esse ltself. thus leter 
ln1ng 1. t as an act detend.nee a potentialt tJ'e For the ease I ESp 
of Is eaeent1.al17 otheJ:' than that to wh10h 1t 1s added a8 a oe.tal 
eteJ:'mln1ng pr1nolple." 
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possible' Kow mot we pr ooeed if we wish to know and apea.k of all 
reality 1n the light of some unitary aspeot? We are both oonfron-
ted with the awful variet,. that .real things display. and yet oan 
both sense that there 1s some oommon denOminator. That ow:' meta-
-
physios and Hartshorne's differ is due to his chooslng features of 
one segment of reality. the o1"ganio segment, and predicating them 
of the ret.Bin1118 segment', the ino.rganio, while we think 1 t bette1* 
to respect the obvious va.riet,1' of real things and seek an element 
of unity in an ortle.r mo.re basic than. thst of the essences of things 
of oar experience. 
The latte1" procedure bas these aavantages. First, pre4ioatins 
similari ty of all things on the plane of their existenoe f rather 
than of theu essence,allows us to sp3sk 41r8c1:17 of all things. 
Hartsho.rne oannot talk rman1ngfully sbout .rooks and oha11's exoept 
insofar as they are either oomposed of organic pa1"ts 01" are parts 
of a more ino1usive organl_. This can be oompa..red to being able 
to speak about huma.n beings only insofar as they are members of a 
gl'OUP or a..re oomposed of different membe.rs and parts. To say that 
a stone 1s oompoaedof organisms is to speak d1.reetly about the 
stonets pe,rts, only 1nd1.r8ot11 about the stone. But on the othe.r 
~andf all things whioh exist oan be spoken of d1reotly 1n a meta-
physios whioh takes existenoe as tbe most basio aspeot of .reality_ 
8eoond, it we ventv6 a bit fu.rthe.r into this roota.physios thall 
its starting pOint, we come to a realiZation of tbe .relationship of 
essenoe and existenoe. We realize that even if we we.ra to find 1n 
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real! t1 some oommon essential oha.racterl.stic. we would still be 
fa.ced wlth the deeplJT uoubllng problem. "How is it that thette &re, 
things composed of essenoe and enatence. sinoe a oomposed being of 
thls 80.rt cannot be the S01U'OO of its own oomposition? How oan a 
beil'18 whose axis tenee ls quallfied eYe.r oome to be r Vie see the. t 
"to be" and "to be organio" are not ooextensive and begin to wondel" 
what 80.rt of beillg must be ~s:ponslble fOJ: the limlts:tlon of the 
It to be" of the things we expe.rienoe. :But a metaphysics built on 
oommon essential ohar6ote1"istlos cannot dee.1 with this s01"t of 
tp,roblem; it can only say "{h~t things Me, not !tl!l they 8o1"e, beoause 
1 t does not e%pIO" the faot that they a.re. A metaphysios like , 
~tsho1"ne's oannot deal with oel"taln quite basio philosophioal 
tp.robleme. 
Th:Lrd, IIa1"tsho1"l1&'s netaphyslos .rests on the assumption that 
the only variables available tOl.' pred.ioation of all th1ngs a..re 
those of oomparative psyohology ana of physios (wbloh 81"e a YB.rie.nt 
form of psyohOlogy·s). But we have seen that by golns beyond the 
whatness of things (thoir oree.nioity or non-oJ.'gan1o1 ty. in this 
case) and oons1de.ri~ them simply so far as thel exist It anothel.' set 
of v&.rables is discovered, tho erlstentlal va.rlablee. ~ie d18-
oovel.'Y makes Rartshome 1 e dlohotomy non.exbaustiveand allows 11S to 
[d isagl.'eo with his statement that tm psychic ?e.l.'iables a.re the onlll 
ones with unlimited range and supl.'ome flexibl11t1. 10 Even mol'S sc 
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oan we deD7 his wppositlon that unless some aet of essential ohau! 
aote~istlos is predloable of eTe~yth1n8. metaphyslos 1s lmposslble 
toz the Yarlables we have pointed out belong to a th1Dg slmply be. 
oanse it esista, not beoauM it u1sts in this o.r that pa.rtlculu 
ma:rmel', whethe.r that lJJl.l'lJ'l81' be o.rganioal17. non-orssl'l108lly. or 
what have you. 
The Vpe of 'UJ1$.ty wblch ou nataph,valos flnds in .reality is 
not this aimple 1Ul1ty of one olass ws,tb ~ membe!'s, but the more 
t.DUOUD unity of a multltude of th1D88 Whioh are slm1lal' to one 
anotbar onlr 1bsof.ar as thet.r oharacte.rlatlos are proportional to 
thet.r aot of ex1stll11. !rhat ls, they are like each othU' inset ..... 
as those oJaraoteristlcs whloh make them to be what they &.ret in 
the sense of beiDg full), oonorete indl1'lduals. beal' a .relation to 
the fact t_ t they.a.N eUQb ana 8110h fu.l1y oonorete 1ndi1'1duale. 
, -
We are dealing. in othe, wol'cte. with a umt),-in-mltlpllot.ty whloh 
finds both terms in .reality. Whe.reaa "ani_te stones" anti "antmat 
plantS- aobieve a real mnltipllo1ty (doge are not stones. no.r is 
one stone anoth.!' stone );. but only & oonceptual or abstraot tD11t7. 
the "'beautlful. apple." a.nd the "beautiful stonea" aohieve a ",_1 
1U11tl as well. Fol' the, aohie'" an amlogous unit7: the beauty of 
both i8 not a JD1.raouloual7 mltlp118d 14entlt7. but a beau.t,., share 
in tn proportion to those thll'l8s' uar1ns in the faot of be1ng. 
81noe this oondlt10n or state of atfa1.r8 obtawe 111 ,..&11t7, a t 
me1ur.ph7sioe mst take aooount of 1 t ana OJlly assign things this 
ana1oloua t7P8 of unit,._ The question whether all th1llgs are mem-
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eN of Ol1e olasa 18 thus allSWel'ed wi th a • no·. and w1 th 1 t the 
furthel' asael'tion that the psyohological variables a~ applicable 
to all things. 
, 
Th1s taklns aooount ot the analogous 11111 ty of thlDga haa lm-
pOl'tant oonsequenoes. Although lt is otten neoessar,. to speak of 
thinee as thOllBh ". we.tte atUlbutlnS oha.raoterlstloa to them in the 
same sene .. , mthe.l' than as pl'opol'tloned to the various deSNes of 
pa,t'tlolpa tlOll of theee thlnse In ene1;811Oe. we GuSht not to 10_ 
aight o~ the faot that 'thls Deoeeslt7 ilON. t.l"om la.Jl81l8088 and that~ 
a suoh. ~. doea not aoo't1.ftJ.tillJ' m1..l'.ro.r .real! t7' "'.1.'1;1181888. 
our gow1e4&t _at be ~otU-ate :In thl. nsart. Both dOS8 and men 
.re allT&, for esample _ but we caMot .reason trom th1a that the 
lfa prope.r to euh la of the aame tJ'pe. fte 0'baervatl011 .~ thls 
p.rlnelpl.e will be espeoiall,. important in spaakiq about God, sinoe 
s e::latol'1Oe liftsZB so .radloally f.rom that of fItoIQ'thlns else. 
o. XlrOWLEDGE OF GOD TImOUGB PROOF FOR BIS EnSfE.NOE 
Bal'tshOl'De &nswers the seoond sreat problem of hia ph1losop~. 
Bow oan we speak meaningful17 about G04 l' slODS tho .. me 11nes as 
the fur .. '_ lie l'easol'lB that if all 1'eal1 t7 oan be spoken of mean-
lngfu117 onl7 lnsofu as 1't bear. 1'$soDibl811oe to lntul ti:".17 mown 
:amall expel-ienoe. God oan be no ezoep't1oD. If an easentlal. Ghar-
OtO.r18t10 o~ h1UJlU1 oxparlenoe 1. to antloipate ana 'to .remanbel' t 
hen (Jod also must antioipate 8Di "member. !.he same holds tn. 0 
ethel' ohal'ao'tennlos. 
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B.evel', a oonsistent app11cat10n of 'theal tel'l'lBtlve we have 
proposed to lIat'tshome' 8 philoso1lh1' deanda that we tust know the. 
Goa exle ts befo.re we ean sal" anJ1;hlns else about Blm. This olear 
follows from the prlnciple that thlngs exh1b1 t an analogous unit1 
in the .relation of thell' oharaoterletioe to the mea81U'8 of thell' 
:r!.stence. If somethlng does not exist, it does not en1b1t the 
exlstent1al var1ables at all, 1f 1t e21sts 1n a 11DltGd mauner, 1t 
xh1blts them in p.ree1eely that 18l'tlou1ar 11mlted ma.nnar, and so 
on. Jr. when we oome to speak of God, 1t 1s qu1te essential that 
e know 3ust what lt1nd of beins • ls, if we &.I.'e to be justified 
sannS that a.t1.1 statement about Rim 1s l'eal17 meaninSful. 
In wllat -.mtel' does God exlst? fbe ft.l'st d1fft.ou.lt7 enoOlln-
te.red in answel'1D8tl1!.s'. 18 the faot that we do not see GoB. as we 
see stones ana hONes. In faot, though we -7 belleve Be atsts, 
e do not 78t know tbat thie ls so. ,~ two reasons, then, GoI's 
" exls tenoe DIlat be demonstl'ate4, ftl'st.. so that we -7 know l!!!! He 
exlets; seoond, so that we oan know, l1"om the p.roof to.r me ens-
teno.~, 1!l ~he:t maane.r lie alsts. fte &_17818 ot oompoeed belngs 
mentioned above tells 118 that thls eart of belng must have a cause 
of lts edatenoe 1n 80me being who ls not so eomposed. Sinoe oom-
pos1tlonls the so~oe of 11mltation, this oause of limitea be1ngs, 
GOd. e:rle "s III all 1l1111m1 ted manne.r. Thus to speak meanlngfllllJ' 
bout GOdi• we must take &Gooet of the taot tot whatever 18 pred-
10ated of Him 1s e2Mbl ted by H1m 1n an 1Il111mi tea JJaJme.r. 
bs we sal' that "God ls good," meaning that., 18 8001. wlth-
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out a.ny qualifloation o.r limitation on that goodness. We know that 
He 1s good beoause whateveR eXists has this onaraoterlctl0. "Good" 
means "4e81.l'&ble." If we ask wbat 1t is that is desired or o011ght 
atter (b7 men. dogs, ravens. o.r what haTe you'. we might give a 
li8t of the many 8J'ld Tarious things whioh _oh seekEh In general, 
however, we oan say that that whioh exists 1s desired {and so is 
desirable l, that whioh does not e::rist is not desired. fllis latter 
statement implies that the tbing does not e:rist in any way It e1 ther 
in realitY' or in someone' s mind. We oan verify this bl oonaiderins 
that whaten .... is desired either exists or is thought to enst, be-
oause the onlY' al terns. il va would be the absurdi tY' that someone o.r 
sormtl't.J.ll8 desires nothing. But this is equivalent to sa.;ving tha.t 
someone or something does not desire. Thus that whioh exists is 
desirable'. or oapable of being desired {and', given the fact that 
there are beings who des1.re, some thi:ngs among those that exist 
are actually des1.red " and what does not exist is not desirable. 
Further, this c1esil'abl1i t7 is propol'tloned to the deg.ree of parti-
olpation of the c1eslrable thing 1n existenoe (insofar aa the being 
who d8Sil'8S is awal'S of that degl'oe of pa,rtloipation). The thing 
which pBl'tiolpatss mol'e in existenoe can contribute more to the 
belng tiosil'lng it if it is attained; again. it oan be known to a 
g.l'eater extent (since its being exhibits more knowable aspeots thsn 
a lesser being does) and thus arOUS6 a 8J:'eater des1l'e. Wisdom, for 
example, is more desl~able than sensual pleasure, oonsidel'ing both 
these things as they are in themeelTes and not as theY' nJiY 01' may 
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not be known to be desi.ra.ble to partioular indIviduals. If, then, 
as we have pointed out, God is not me.rellT a p8l"tloipant in exis-
tence, but rath91* is Existence I tse1f, He 113 the most desira.ble 
thing the1*e is 01* oan be, sinoe attainment of God Will enrioh the 
being of the one attaining Rim to the gl"eatest possible extent, OJ." 
the moat pe.rfeot manner possible. ana because God exhlblts mo.re 
knowable aS180ts than any othe.r aotual or posslble thins and can 
thus 81*OU89 an "1nflni teft desire in us( that ls, a desire for the 
Infinite). 
But this is not all that oan be meant 1n sa71ng that God is 
gooi", far we are not dealing he.re with Just another thing that par" 
tlo1pates in existence and tbus exhlbl t.8 the exis tential ftJ.'1ables 
in a certain fashion. I f we analyse the notlon of partioipation, 
01' ask what 1. t meatJ.s to be a ];Srtic1pa.ted being, \Y9 see that It 
involves more than sh81'1118 in various deg:.ree8 in the formal ohS1"-
aotel'i8tl08 1nVolTecl in some notion. It thls W9l'e so. otU.' us"a-
phy'sics would differ from liartsho.rne' s in oDly two respeots: :til'st 
we have chosen 8, notion, the Judgment of eXistence, as our sta.rtini 
point, while he has ohosen 8. sot of oomepts of e. cel'tain type; 
seoontt. we oonceptual!se this notion In the existential variables, 
whIle he uses the psychologicsl variables. Aotually. ht7N9Ver. a 
filUoh more fundamen"al distinction is involved. 
1.48t us return to the pl'oviotts oonside.ration ot lim1ted beings 
we say they al'e limited because thail' existence is "not infinite": 
thel enst in 8110h a.nd such a. manne.r t but do not exlst abaolnte17 
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OJ.- without Q.W:lllflcation. To rea.son from this fact to the necess-
arY' existenoe of a being whose existence is not lim1ted involves 
muoh more. ot oourse, than th~ assertion that things oomposed of 
existence and a limtt of existence require something unlimited in 
existence to do the composing o.r lim1ting. It imrolY6s. for one 
thing, BD analysis of the notion of e21stenoe. We ask, "Ie exis-
tence an 'aativi t1" whioh by lts verg natu8 implies some lim1 ta-
tion of that aoilvity in whateve.r it may be found?" If we truly 
have existenoe in mind. ani! not some fo.t:m of existenoe whioh of it 
nature is limited CDlte.r1a.l e~istencef foz- eample}. 1t can be sa 
that the faot that a thing exists doea not Ou.ry w1 ill it the fact 
that this thing eXists as limited. This oan be oompared to the 
ore limited oomept of rationality: nothil'l8 within this conoept 
implies that rationality will be limited to those things which a.o-
tually exist and aze ~&t1ov~. In this example. two oonsequences 
allow: first, there coSld be a potontlsJ.ly 1nft.nlte number of 
aiions,l things; aeoond, the llm1tation of .rational things to this 
particmlar number of tt .rationale" is not due to the intrinsio nee-
ssl tles of tlle oonoept iteelf. Sim11e..rly \d.th the notion of bei 
Sime nothing in the notion itself implies that existents exist as 
1m! ted. two oonsequenoes follOW: first;. aormthlng outSide of them 
s .responsible for their beine 11111.1 ted. This oould onlY be some 
:xlstent who exists w1thout 11mit. Seoond;, since 1t would mez-ely 
e pla71ng with fiords to say that limited things fust existed fU1tt 
then W9re limited in the1.r eXistenoe, the verl faot that they exist 
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must also be asoribed to the unlimlted existent. In other words', 
sinoe eXistenoe and esse.noe are not two rarts of a being but 'two 
aspeots, quite inseparable in reality, the u.nJJ.mited existent is 
the oause of the (lim1 ted) existenoe of Anita beings. on this 
ground we oan asorlbe to God the charaoteristios of the being He 
oauses, as the cause of these ohe..raotaristios. We oould, for ex-
ample, also say that God is good in the sense that He is the oause 
of goodness in all limited beings. 
BetlYeen OUl.' nstaphysios and lIlrtshorne f s, then, lies this dif .. 
ferenoel in hiS, the p8!"tioular things of *ioh the psychologioal 
'Variables t.iU8 pred1cated share in those variables ol1JJr aooording 
to formal causality. In ours, hONeve!", the V81"1 reasoning in-
volved in oomingto a. knowledge of God's existenoe .re'Veale H1m as 
existential oause. 
Hs.rtshome has deoided that God e::d.sts as a. limited being and 
predioates the psyoh,ologioal 'Variables of am aooordingly. After 
he has done this in a logioally ooherent rne.nner and wi th an e1e to 
make Him the most .Perfeot Being in a "religious sense," he puts 
forth a. formal proof for Bis existenoe based on the oonoeption of 
Godha has thus oonstruoted. But in the light of the metap~yeios 
we ha'Ve proposed, he has no right to say anything about God until 
Rie eX'istenoe 1s established. If, for example, lJartahome says 
that "God is good," what real meaning does this hl3.ve? Knowledge 
of Godls mode of existenoe 1s the primary and basto prerequisite 
for predioa.ting &1\1 attribute of Rim, for lt is only from this 
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knowledge that we learn what kind of being lIe 1s and oonsequent17 
ssy anything mean1ngtul abau t Hirn. 
We can illustrate this dif'f'e.l'enoe in method between the two 
metaphysios by oons1de.ring two problema whioh ltLrtshorne uses to 
9,rgue against the notion of an aotually infinlte GOd: his analYsis 
of knowledge, and h1s oonoem that God be ".religiously" pe.rfeot. 
Knowing is a reJa ti on of the thlJlS known and the knower in 
~h1oh the knower 113 reall1 .rela. t1 ve to and dependent on the thing 
~own.l1 Since God knows all th1.ngs am mov/s them complete17. Be 
~s the most dependent being, the most .relative. 111 .regard to knowl-
~dge. If, fe.r example. God haa created a different un1ve.rse than 
~be one :He actl.'U41j! has o.rested, He would know that universe in-
~teaa of' this one and thus sustain a dif'te.rent relationsh1p.l2 
This, Bl.rtshol'l'l6 inters, pointe to a :ani te Goa. 
HCI'I6Ver. it oan be argued that lJirtshome's diScussion of 
knowledge does not tell us vl.b.at knowleage as suoh 1s;ho rathe1" 
states oharacteristios whioh sonetim9s attena knowledge, speoifi-
cally, .real relativity aDd real depenaenoe. The first ta8k, then, 
~n l"etuting this argument is to give a mare lnto..!'Ilat1ve daso..rip-
~lon of knowle dge. 
llBartshoms, The, Dlv1l'lE! Rela,t1rttz. p. 8. 
l2Of. ~.t pp- 12-15. 
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\1e oan say that it is a vital sctivi ty by wld.ch the oha.racte.r-
istics of anothe.r being (including in this last te.rm the knOW'61' 
himself when he knows himself o.r is the objeot of his knowledge) 
a..re present to, o.r possessed by, the one knowing, in an lnmate.rlal 
o.r non-physioal manner, preoisely as the oharaoteristios of the 
othel' being. "Pl'esent In an iI:'lm9.terlal mannel'" means that the 
oluu.'aeterlstloa whioh are known. do not beoome oha..ractol'lstlos whiob 
oan be atil'ibuted to the knowel', e.g •• a man eeeins a .red wall 
possesses .red, but not in Buch a mannel' that we oould say that he 
ie .red, o.r e. .red man. "As the cha.raot&rletios of the othel' being" 
emphasises the faot that the cha.raote.rietlos .remain p.redioable of 
the thins known, but not the knowe.r, and points out that in thoae 
knowers capable of aome sort of .refleotlon o.r aelf.awareness. these 
cha.raotel'istios a.re .recognised &s belonging to the thing known. 
"Possession o;tt' and "present to" must remainsoD'8what tmdefined, 
but theil' 1l'lumlng oon be asoertained f.rom the simple e:x:pe.rienoe of 
knowing. In genaral. we oa.n say that these terms signify a pa.rt1-
o1patlon in the being (b7 way of formal 0811sa11 tll of the thing 
known. Effioient oau.sa1i ty ls exolud ed 'beoause knowledge 1s a 
vital aotivity (although there rtay be effioient oausality involved 
In the reduction of finite knowers f.rom potential to aotual knowl-
edg8) • 
Oan God have knowledge? That God knows is oonsistent with the 
~aot tbat He 1s E:xlstenoe Itself. We find. first, that the m01'e 
~:lCoellent1y a. being partiCipates in existence. the mere exoellent 
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is his knowledge It for higher types of beings know things both mol'S 
complete17 and in a Simpler mlnne.r than lower types. A nan can 
know something about all plants by mans of a oonoept, but a lower 
anizral onl.1 knows something about those plants it has sensed. A-
gain. a ma.n oan know that all plants g1 ve off oxygen, but a 10we.l" 
ani_l oa.n fo.rm no universal judgments about them. On these 
grounds, God shoUld know things more oompletely and more simply 
than any other being. Seoond, we note that nothing in the des-
oription of knowledge moesaarily implies that the knower be a :tin-
i te thing; "partioipation by way of f0l'1rB1 oausal1 t1 1n the othar 
tbeill8's ohat'aotel'istios'" does not imply finitude because the oans-
~11 t1 involved do es not imply .real depend enoe of the klu'lier on the 
known. In finite thingS, the.re 1s 'Chia dependenoe. In God's case, 
lie possesses the fQ\"t.n8l Chs..raotenstlos at· t. thing as ther are 
frlrtuaJ.ll" oontained in B10 own being, and thus thel'e 1s no need :tOt' 
rthem to be oaused in H1m b:9' the thing known. Indeed. sinoe Goa is 
rthe oodsten1:1eJ. cause of &11 :anite things, Be nIlst b9.Ye p8t'feot 
)tnowledge of them, insofar as tho7 are partioipations in Bie OWn 
being. Thus to Spltak of God as partioipating in the fom of anoth-
e.r being is more o.r less a wa.:v of speaking that bas been de.l"ivsd 
f.rom finite th1ngs, and oannot rrean that the.re 1s a.n:v .real depend .. 
enoe of God on vche.t Be knows in the "p.reparato.ry phases" 0: knowl-
edge: because Be already possesses tm cba.raotG1"1stloa of the 
things !fs knows, God is not .reduced from potential to aotual knowl-
~dge. 
61 
E. GaD'S RELIGIOUS VALUE 
Di..rtsbo.rne states that a completel.1 n.on.....relati'Ve God cannot 
fulfill tbe asptratlons of the .t'elig1OD.s pt.rson; unless GOd can 
re spend sens1 tll'e~7 to men ( that 1s, have the pot enol" of "sensl t1 ve 
response to l1tflli' )'. He is less than .re11g100.sl7 pa.rfeetl 
Asm.u.-&noe that, at worst'. our slme.rel.r right efforts 
will, in the long run, howeve.r distMt, produce on tbe 
average more goOd than our 1nslnoe.re ~ penel'sely mo-
tJ:rateil actions, we must have. Thus omnipotenoe in the 
fom of a general prov1d entia]. tendenoy fa'Vo.r1ng the 
good and able to gua.,ra.ntee it a. minimum Of pe1"sistenoe 
throuSh all future time a.nswel's to a genuine spi.r1tual 
need. But fol' omnipotenoe whioh gua~nteea the exa.ot 
deg.ree ana tbe last detail of future goods there is not 
only no need but a.lso no possible plaoe in an ethioally 
signifioant wo.rld·.13 
This genuine spi.rltual need oan thus be filled only if God is a 
llim1 ted being and so able to .respond to our goot! and bad aots. 
In o.rltloism of th1a. we ooUld aooept Bartshor.ne's statement 
that knowledge that our sincerely .right effo.rts w11l produce more 
good than evil 1s neoeseazy 12'1 an ethioally signifioant world (al-
though we might well ask, "Good tor whom?" Is 1t neoesS8ZY that 
the good involved be anything othez than the perfeotion. 1n some 
pna::rmet.r. of the one perfo.rm1ng the good aot?) \1e oan ruther agree 
that we want suoh a wo.rld, and that suoh 1s possible if God is as 
Hartshorne says. But we mast make two additional statements: 
62 
i,rst, we know f.rom the p.roof for God's e:riatenae that He 1s not 
fin1te, and that the,refore the desil'e far an ethioally signifioant 
0.1'14 mst be .reoonoiled with this faot; seoond, God's infinity in 
the ordez- of existence does not nonasei tate Ble "gua.rs.nteeing the 
%aet deg,ree and last detail of future goode." 
Both statements are 3ustified by these consl~arations. Barts 
o,rne's identification of an infinite God With a proVida.r-of-all-
etal1s is based on the assumption that if God can do all things, 
e oan do nothing. That is, it p.llesupposes that if GOd bas intin-
ts power, He must ileny othe.r beings the exe.roise of any pow8l' 
hatsOEtver (J.n this case, the power of t.ree wl11). But it men a.re 
(that we a,re seems mol'e a natte.r of oocperienoe than the out .. 
ome of all1 demonst~ation). thaze is no inoonsistency in sayiq 
they themselves a.re ~esponslble fez their good and ertl aots, 
nd the oOllSequenoes flovi1ng f.rom them, anc1 sa,vins that God is all 
owel'ful. That Be could cont~ol eve~~ detail of future 9yents 
• 
questioned; t:t.t He does not do so di.reotly, OJ:' wi thout 
he instrumental!t,- of finite things, is oontradioted byou.r expel' 
enoe of out'selves as fzee. These two facts us lalol'1lH God is all ... 
oW9l'ful, men a.re tl."ee. Difficulties have su.rel,- been plentiful in 
the e:xploration of tho state of atfa.1rs which J:'9sul ts from these 
wo faots, but positing one does not necessitate deX11ins the other. 
f, on the other hand, we adopt Hartshorne's extreme position that 
od's omnipotence means the end of fl'ee will (this does seem to be 
one yalid way of lnierpretlng Bls omnipotenoe). we ought to accept 
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a fin!. te God in orasr to retain an ethioally signifioant world, onE 
in whioh froe will oan effeotive1y ope.rate. But suoh a prooedue 
imp1ias that we have taken God's infinity as a postulate and not 
as a f&ot; if it is taken QS a faot, snd troe will not dented, the 
10gioal oonsequenoe ls the .rejeotion of the interpretation of omni. 
potence as denying t.ree will. If the .... e a1"G other possible inter-
pretations of omnipoteme. these ought to be e;p:am1.ned. To erlend 
Ha.l'tshorm's pt"ooe{llll"e. we might deo1de that such omnlpotenoe as 
woula elfclutfefree wSll 1s more desirable than an ethioa.lly signif" 
ioant world, anit thus deny free will. A htnnan1.st. such as Ral"ts .. 
horne, will of oourse deoiile in favol.' of free will, a "worshipper 
of pow(.u!t against it. But the actual facts are that God. can do eJJ 
thl:nes andtbat men al.'e free; nei thOl.' oan be denied if we want to 
keep on talk1ng about the real world.14 
A m6amn8:f'ul metaphysios ana philosoph-v of God are posslblG li 
reality 113 oonaitlere« from the viewpoint of existenoe. Hartshorne 
seems to fall short of this: hie philosophY. in its origins. 1s an 
a ttempt to make coa11 ty fully Tnea.ningM in the faoe of r.n appareni 
laok of this very quall ty. The means ohosen for aooomplish1ng th1~ 
task. u.n:i!ortmls to 11, is the aooeptanoe of an a.vowed hypothaei s on 
tho sconntls that the non-fIJ.Ooeptanoe of this hypothesiS would des-
troy the v~.ltle of human life. The alternative we have proposed to 
.... u*.~ .... If If.. , ,. 
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;panpsych1am and panentheism floes not banish myste.ry f.rom those 
a.reas of expe.rienoe which Hartshorne thinks should be non-m.vater-
~ous. but, as we have tried to show, a lmaningf1l1 meta.physios need 
rl.ot be 0. .ra.tionallstio metaphlrs1os. 
In oonclusion, we can exp.ress ou.r ag.reement with John '[fild t 13 
3udgment on B'a.rtshorl'le's ph110aopbzt of Goih 
Even though we cannot acoept ltr. ltat'tsho.rne's answer, 
whioh would seem to involve tbe elimination of Deity, 
we must be g.rateful to him fo.r .raising these cruoia.l 
questions once nlOH in a. nanner whloh is both sharp 
a.nd penet.ratlllBf and whioh (Ulm. .. ot help but lead to 
much needed fu.rihe.r amlysls.J.f) 
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